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Introduction

The current international political system was born out of centuries of war in Europe,
extended to the rest of the world during the colonial and imperial eras, and inherited by the
United States following the conclusion of World War II. Using its economic and military
influence, the United States made a variety of commitments to its allies around the world,
creating an institutionalized structure for international relations known as the global liberal order.
The end of the Cold War reinforced the United States’ role as the world’s dominant political,
economic, and military power. For many observers, the Cold War’s conclusion solidified the
credibility of the American vision of global order. As a result, theories of a unipolar world
centered on U.S interests and upheld by the hegemony of the United States have become more
popular since the fall of the Soviet Union. In 2004, Charles Krauthammer, an influential
American conservative, stated that “on December 26, 1991, the Soviet Union died and something
new was born… a unipolar world dominated by a single superpower unchecked by any rival and
with decisive reach in every corner of the world. This is a staggering development in history, not
seen since the fall of Rome”. 1 Just one year after Krauthammer’s exclamation of U.S.
unipolarity, a survey from the Economist titled “the New Titans” reported that the developing
countries made up more than half of the world’s total GDP. 2 The rise of international actors that
are not traditional stakeholders in the international political system constructed by the United
States has called into question what this development will mean for the future of global politics.
The emerging economies of developing nations suggest that the world, in economic terms, is
heading towards multipolarity, despite assumptions that the post-Cold War era is singularly
1

Charles Krauthammer, “An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World,” Speech, Irving Kristol Lecture,
American Enterprise Institute Dinner, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., February 10, 2004.
2
Pam Woodall, “The New Titans,” The Economist, September 14th, 2006,
http://www.economist.com/node/7877959.
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defined by American hegemony.
One of the major rising countries of the developing world is China. Before the 21st
century, onlookers in the field of international relations were unsure of how much China would
matter in the future given the emphasis on American unipolarity. This is no longer the case.
China’s rise as a great power within the international system began with various economic
reforms aimed at modernizing the country starting in 1978. Adopting a strategy of rapid
economic modernization called for China to integrate itself in the framework of the international
economic system created by the United States. By adapting to the prevailing norm of Westerncapitalist principles of exchange and joining core institutions of the global economic order like
the World Trade Organization, China’s strategy over the past four decades has greatly enhanced
its position in the international political system through its acquired economic power. Nowadays,
universal recognition of the familiar slogan, “Made in China”, by virtually all consumers speaks
to China’s growing presence in the world.

China’s ascent as a great power within the international system has garnered the most
attention out of all the major headlines of the millennium. 3 Given the prominence of the topic
among scholars, pundits, analysts and policy makers in the West, the rise of China as a major
player in global politics has become seemingly conventional wisdom. 4 Now, the debate revolves
around how China’s newfound capabilities and national power will affect the international
political system. While China’s growth is a direct result of its integration into the U.S-led
economic order, there is no consensus among IR scholars as to what this will mean for the future
of Sino-American relations and the structure of the global liberal order.
3

Michael Beckley, “Chinas Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security, 36, 3 (2012): 41
Xiaoming Zhang, “China in the Conception of International Society: the English School’s engagements with
China,” Review of International Studies, 37 (2011): 777

4
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A country’s economic strength underlies its political and military influence in
international relations. In The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Paul Kennedy argues that the
ability of modern nations to exercise and sustain global hegemony lies in their productive
capacity. 5 China continues to sustain impressive economic growth and is projected to double the
size of the American economy by 2025, while the United States and other status quo market
economies recover from the shock of the Western Financial Crisis of 2008. 6 In this environment,
some authors cite evidence of friction between China and the United States increasing in the
future. From the perspective of these authors, China is a revisionist power that will dramatically
alter the dynamic of global affairs as its economic development increases its power to a
hegemonic level. On this side of the debate, authors’ concerns vary from generic assumptions
based on China’s communist leadership to more serious fears of great power conflict that stem
from the Chinese behavior in the aftermath of the Western Financial Crisis. On the other side of
the debate, authors counter the conclusions of the “China threat theory” by offering historical
and/or strategic analysis of China’s relationship with the international system. For a variety a
reasons, these authors believe China favors the economic benefits of status quo stability and is a
power that will support the foundations of the global order constructed by the United States.

My thesis on the rise of China and the future of the global liberal order is organized into
four chapters. The first chapter is a review of the literature. The review presents three potential
scenarios on China’s future role in international politics. Taken together, the arguments of each
scenario provide a foundation for interpreting the evidence that is presented in the next chapters.

5

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000
(London, Fontana Press, 1988): 472-480
6
Dominic Wilson and Anna Stupnytska, “The N-11: More than An Acronym,” Goldman Sachs Global Economic
Papers, 153 (2007): 8-9
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The second chapter is a case study on China’s relationship with the World Trade
Organization (WTO). The World Trade Organization deals with the global rules of trade between
nations and is a core institution of the global liberal order. This chapter looks at alternative
interpretations of China’s membership in the WTO. The evidence presented by each school of
thought identifies developments for assessing China’s future impact on the international
economic system.

The third chapter is a case study on China’s behavior in the South China Sea (SCS). The
South China Sea is a smaller body of water within the Pacific Ocean, where territorial disputes
between China and several other nations have the potential to disrupt peace and stability within
the region. The case study in Chapter Three follows the same methodological approach of the
second chapter by utilizing alternative interpretations on China’s activity in the South China Sea.
The evidence presented by the two schools of thought provides a framework for assessing
China’s future impact on status quo peace and stability of the international political system.

The first three chapters lay out the crucial arguments for thinking about the future
trajectory of Chinese foreign policy. The fourth chapter draws conclusions on the research
presented in the prior chapters. In this chapter, I offer an overall analysis of the evidence
presented in the second and third chapters. In closing, I present my own conclusion on the rise of
China and the future of the international political system.
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Chapter 1: Review of the Literature

This chapter outlines the architecture of the international political system and introduces
the debate on the rise of China. There is no consensus in the literature over how China’s rise as a
great power will affect the status quo of the global liberal order, the international political system
created by the United States. Disagreement over the nature of China’s behavior contributes to
why authors foresee China’s rise manifesting itself in different ways. The review of the literature
in this chapter offers a brief summary of the global liberal order and the two dominant schools of
thought on China’s behavior in the post-2008 era before outlining three scenarios related to
China’s future impact on global politics (China as a spoiler, supporter, or shirker).

There are two dominant schools of thought on China’s behavior in the post-2008 era. The
first school of thought believes China favors a strategy of noncompliance in regards to
established international norms. The second school of thought believes China still favors an
approach of working within the multilateral structure of the international political system. The
two dominant schools of thought offer evidence for evaluating three future scenarios concerning
China’s behavior.

Next, the chapter describes the spoiler, supporter, and shirker scenarios. These scenarios
illustrate possible future roles for China in the international political system. After outlining the
relevant literature, the thesis conducts a case study of China’s behavior in the World Trade
Organization in Chapter 2, and a second case study of its actions in the South China Sea in
Chapter 3. Framing each case study through alternative interpretations of China’s actions
highlights the important points for considering scenarios of China’s future impact on the
international political system.
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The Two Schools of Thought on China’s Behavior in the Global Liberal Order

The global liberal order is characterized by American global hegemony and an emphasis
on Western rules, norms, and institutions. After the conclusion of World War II, using its
“newfound power and authority” the United States built a range of regional and global
institutions as a way of shaping the international system to its preferences. The collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991 enhanced the United States’ pre-eminent position in the world, as the main
challenger to U.S. dominance was defeated and the legitimacy of American-constructed
institutions solidified. 7 As the world’s largest economy and strongest military power, the United
States used its global power to shape the international political system to American values and
interests. 8 As a result, the international political system reflects a Western oriented global order.
Its rules and institutions are rooted in the concepts of democracy and capitalism. When
evaluating the character of the global liberal order, John Ikenberry, an influential scholar within
the debate, concludes that the system is integrative and expansive, and provides a strategic
framework for state security and cooperation under the umbrella of American political,
economic, and military influence. 9 While the United States has faced a significant amount of
challenges in the 21st century, from a massive budget deficit and the impact of the Western
Financial Crisis in 2008-2009 to the economic costs of sustaining wars in the Middle East, it
remains the world’s most preponderant power and the model for global governance it
constructed is uncontested. The question is how China will affect the global system created and
led by the United States.
7

Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order
(New York: Penguin, 2009), 1.
8
Ibid., 498-99.
9
G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China: Power, Institutions, and the Western Order,” From Ross, Robert S. and
Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, (New York: Cornell
University Press, 2008):114.
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The two dominant schools of thought on China’s strategy in the post-2008 era are
important to forming conclusions on its future behavior in the global liberal order. The two
dominant schools of thought within the scholarly literature are informed by core assumptions
about China’s strategy in the post-2008 era. On the one hand, author Michael Yahuda and many
writers for Western media sources perceive a new assertiveness in China’s foreign policy that
signals a departure from abiding by the status quo and norms championed by the U.S order. 10 On
the other hand, Ning Liao claims “today’s China is not only a participant but also a proactive
actor shaping the regional security multilateralism”. 11 The evidence that can be cited in favor of
these assertions provides a framework for anticipating China’s role in the future. The first school
of thought believes that China has adopted a more “aggressive” policy, citing China’s actions in
the post-2008 period that suggest the Chinese government has abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s
longtime axiom not to treat the United States as an adversary and to shelve sovereignty disputes
in favor of joint development. This view promotes the belief that China is seeking to challenge
the U.S. and the global liberal order. The second school of thought believes China has not
dramatically changed or abandoned Deng’s strategic approach. China still follows a strategy of
peaceful development, working within the framework of multilateralism to avoid disrupting
peace and stability in the international political system. 12

The perspective of the author influences how they look at the evidence and the theories
they offer on China’s behavior. Michael Swaine notes that commentators interpret the relative
assertiveness of China’s activism in different ways. When taken together, characterizations of
10

Michael Yahuda, “China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, No.
81 (2013): 446.
11
Ning Liao, “China’s Regional Diplomacy toward Southeast Asia: Calculations and Constraints of Beijing’s
Engagment in Security Multilateralism,” American Journal of Chinese Studies 19, no. 101 (2012):105.
12
Sarah Raine, “Beijing’s South China Sea Debate,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 53, no.5 (2011), 77;
Yahuda, 446.
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China’s foreign policy approach appear “somewhat vague and ambiguous, potentially
encompassing everything from attempts to play a more active role in a wide variety of
international regimes, to deliberate efforts to alter basic international norms and challenge the
fundamental national interests or policies of the United States”. 13 The debate over what strategy
informs China’s policy influences the formation of divergent scenarios concerning the country’s
future intentions.

China’s Future Role as a Spoiler, Supporter, or Shirker

Both Western and Chinese scholars have made a wide variety of assertions on how the
rise of China will manifest itself in the post-Cold War system. The debate circulates around
whether China will conform to the order created by the United States or if it will use its
increasing power capabilities to shape international order much like the United States did at the
end of World War II. 14 In their article, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International
Order in an Era of U.S. Decline”, Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu identify three dominant
scenarios on how the rise of China may take shape. In its future relationship with the
international political system and American hegemony, China will choose to act as a spoiler, a
supporter, or a shirker in relation to the global liberal order. 15 In reviewing the literature relevant
to the discussion, this chapter outlines the three dominant scenarios on China’s future role in the
international political system. The first scenario foresees China behaving as a “spoiler”,
challenging or disrupting international norms upheld by the status quo actors in the global liberal
order. The second scenario sees China as a “supporter” of the global liberal order. This scenario
13

Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part One: On Core Interests”. China Leadership Monitor, no.
34 (2010):1-2
14
Ikenberry, 90.
15
Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S.
Decline,” International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 42.
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understands China as a responsible stakeholder in the international community and foresees
continuity in China’s strategy of integrating within established standards and practices of the
global liberal order. The third scenario predicts China will behave as a “shirker”. The shirker
scenario predicts China’s foreign policy is inward looking. In this scenario, China will not
disrupt status quo stability, but it will refuse to accept obligations of the global liberal order,
instead focusing on challenges the Chinese government faces in the domestic realm. These three
scenarios are informed by different assumptions and provide a theoretical framework for
thinking about what the evidence in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 indicate about China’s future role
in the world.

The Spoiler Scenario

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has led China to assume the role of the United States’
default adversary. 16 China is a primary strategic consideration to the United States and the great
power by which the United States measures itself militarily. Before September 11, 2001 the Bush
Administration labeled China as a strategic competitor and America’s prime threat. 17 While
China was seen as a strategic partner to America in the war on terror, the Obama Administration
announced a “national security pivot to Asia” in 2012, revealing an enduring American concern
for China’s rise and its future intentions. 18 The pivot is in response to growing concern over the
willingness of the Chinese government to act as a responsible stakeholder in the post-2008 era
and American suspicion over China’s intentions in the South China Sea.

Political differences in the relationship between China and the United States contribute to

16

James Dobbins, “War with China,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 54, no. 4 (2012): 7.
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
17
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a gap in political trust between the two countries. China is not a democracy, has no active civil
society, and has not yet fully liberalized its economy. China “has fiercely contested the
normative changes in post-Cold War international society that have seen human rights and
democratisation become part of the daily round of political practice”. 19 China’s continued
growth within the global system without conforming to Western values such as democracy,
capitalism, and human rights championed by American hegemony has led commentators in the
West to speculate on the possibility of the Sino-U.S. rivalry intensifying. Aaron Friedberg
contemplates that if China “grows richer and stronger without also becoming a liberal
democracy, the present muted rivalry with the United States is likely to blossom into something
more open and dangerous”. 20 If the two countries cannot manage their differences, economic or
military conflict may erupt and disturb the status quo of the global liberal order. Political and
economic differences aside, as an authoritarian regime, the Chinese government lacks the
transparency to assure other states in the international community of the nature, scope, and
intended goals of its military buildup. The double digit spending increases in the Chinese defense
budget since the 1990’s to fuel its military modernization exacerbate fears that China will seek to
challenge the United States and establish its own hegemony in East Asia as its power capabilities
continue to expand. 21 With its defense spending and military capabilities growing, China has
also shown an interest in shaping emerging regional political-institutional contours in East Asia
that seek to exclude the United States. 22

The spoiler scenario has also gained credibility due to various interpretations of Chinese
19

Xiaoming Zhang, “A Rising China and Normative Changes in International Society,” East Asia 28, (2011): 242.
Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York:
W.W. Norton, 2011), 2.
21
Robert Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International Security 34,
no. 2 (2009): 45.
22
Ikenberry, 89.
20
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actions in the South China Sea and World Trade Organization. Is China’s policy aggressive,
assertive, or simply more active? Each term implies different qualities and emphasizes how an
author views China’s behavior. Authors from both the scholarly literature and Western media
sources typically describe China as being more assertive or aggressive. These terms typically
contribute to the spoiler scenario. Aggressive has a confrontational connotation while
assertiveness implies confidence. Activeness indicates a higher frequency of participation in the
international sphere and has a more neutral or positive meaning.

The debate over the character of China’s diplomacy in the international realm emphasizes
the divide in the discussion over China’s future intentions. In recent years, Alastair Johnston has
noted a trend in Western literature and media to cite evidence of a “newly assertive China”,
ranging from

China’s allegedly more assertive diplomacy at the Copenhagen conference on climate
change in December 2009; to its angry reaction to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in January
2010 and to the Dalai Lama’s visit in February 2010; to its apparently more expansive
claims over the South China Sea in March 2010; to its diplomatic defense of violent
actions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in March and November
2010; and to its tough response to the Japanese arrest of a Chinese ashing captain in
September 2010. 23
These instances provide grounds for observers to establish theories of competition between the
United States and China in the global system that could “spoil” the norms of American
hegemony. James Dobbins declares that a climate of mutual distrust and suspicion clouds the
US–China relationship. This produces a potent security dilemma in the international political
system. 24 Amitai Etzioni similarly perceives that increasing tensions between the United States
and China have the potential to lead to a collision between the two powers, citing studies of “a
23 Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’ International Security 37, no. 4
(2013): 9.
24 Dobbins, 22.
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cycle of distrust” with “deep roots in Sino-American history” that has been intensifying since
2008. 25 Could increasing friction in Sino-American foreign policy and strategic suspicion of the
other’s intention bring an end to the stability of the current global system?

China as a spoiler is a “vision and strategy consistent with the traditional realist story of
power transitions”. 26 In the spoiler scenario, China will pose a challenge to the existing order
characterized by global American hegemony: economic and military capabilities will lead China
to circumvent the liberal order and establish a parallel system much like the Soviet Union did in
the years following World War II. Several observers have commented on the fact that while
China sustains impressive economic growth, the economic preponderance of the United States
wavers. 27 These dichotomous trends – the rise of China and decline of the United States – have
led a number of scholars to theorize on the possibility of a power transition.

Aggressive behavior contributes to a theory of power transition consistent with the
spoiler scenario. Power transition theory posits shifting relations between countries as a formula
for system change and war. 28 The theoretical assumptions of power transition create a foundation
for the spoiler scenario to present China as a challenger to global order. This scenario draws on
past instances of hegemonic war to establish an argument for future conflict between the United
States and China. Historically speaking, power transitions typically are accompanied by conflict,
instability, and war. 29 For China, the risk of conflict with the United States will grow in
consequence and in probability as Chinese strength increases. 30 The World Trade Organization

25 Amitai Etzioni, “Accommodating China,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55, no. 2 (2012): 47.
26 Schweller and Pu, 59.
27
Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security 36, No. 3 (2012):
41; Johnston, 7; Jacques, 499.
28
Schweller and Pu, 65.
29
Ikenberry, 90.
30
Dobbins, 8.
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and South China Sea are important focal points for identifying economic and military conflict
between the United States and China.

Castel-Fodor notes that an increasing frequency in the disputes brought to the World
Trade Organization has led many observers and media sources that fall under the spoiler scenario
to cite evidence of a trade war materializing between China and the United States in the WTO. 31
An increase in litigation signals that China’s governance structure is incompatible with
international norms of the global liberal economic order, and could lead to a deterioration of
relations between China and its trading partners. These concerns are one way of understanding
how China’s rise could “spoil” the international economic system upheld by the architecture of
the global liberal order.

Changes in the status of North Korea and Taiwan, Sino-American confrontation in
cyberspace, and disputes arising from China’s uneasy relationships with Japan and India create
tension over China’s rise. A number of flashpoints in China’s relationship with the international
community increase alarm about future conflict, such as in the South China Sea. China has
apparently been more aggressive in the South China Sea to demonstrate its jurisdiction over the
area. This activity appears to be occurring in the whole area within the nine-dotted line, a map
that illustrates China’s sovereignty claim in the South China Sea. China’s actions in the South
China Sea appear to be at odds with the interests of the international community. In reference to
the nine-dotted line, Denny Roy argues that China’s claims in the South China Sea have no
foundation in modern international law. 32 Dobbins notes that the South China Sea has the
potential to become a serious flashpoint in recent years as a result of China’s assertion of its
31

Kennan J. Castel-Fodor, “Providing a Release Valve: The U.S.-China Experience with the WTO Dispute
Settlement System,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 64, no. 1 (2013): 237.
32
Denny Roy, Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security (New York: Cornell, 2013): Ch. 4.
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sovereignty over the region and its military modernization. 33 Whereas friction in the WTO is
occurring in the economic realm, competing security objectives between China, its neighbors,
and the United States in the South China Sea have considerable potential to erupt into military
conflict.

Offensive realist John Mearsheimer believes that China and the United States are
destined to be adversaries. According to Mearsheimer, the “mightiest states attempt to establish
hegemony in their region of the world while making sure that no rival great power dominates
another region”. 34 As Mearsheimer sees it, “no amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense
security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia”. 35 Chinese
insecurities will increase as it continues its rise into a system dominated by US hegemony. If one
is to evaluate Beijing’s regional environment from a realist perspective, the United States’
strategy in East Asia demonstrates “the key features of a cold-war strategy: a military posture
stressing overwhelming superiority and effective deterrence, an ideological position that seeks to
delegitimise China; and a plan of building or reviving a regional diplomatic bloc or bilateral
military alliances in China’s neighbourhood”. 36 For China, displacing US hegemonic power can
only satisfy these insecurities, as being the only regional hegemon in the world is the “ideal
situation”. 37

Scholars who interpret China’s rise through a lens of offensive realism find evidence for
the spoiler scenario by asserting that the increasing aggression in Chinese foreign policy in the
years following 2008’s financial crisis is a conscious decision by the Chinese government to
33

Dobbins, 7-12.
John J. Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise," Current History 105, no. 690 (2006): 160.
35
Ibid., 162.
36
Lanxin Xiang, “China and the ‘Pivot’,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 54, no. 5 (2012): 117.
37
Mearsheimer, 161.
34
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challenge American interests in East Asia. 38 Traditional realist perspectives of power transition
that are consistent with the spoiler scenario assume that the international system is based in
anarchy, that great power military capabilities breed further insecurity, and that no actors can be
completely sure of other’s intentions. This causes states to fear each other, as there is no
omnipresent police force to ensure peaceful resolution of conflict. For China to protect its
national interests, it must continue militarization to back a more assertive policy stance towards
the United States. 39

Mearsheimer understands international relations through a lens that “war perpetuates
international order”. That is, in its bid for regional hegemony, China will have no other way to
secure its national interests unless it displaces US global leadership, and the United States will
have no other choice but to confront China if it wants to sustain its hegemony. In this scenario,
power projection and a robust military to back assertions are the keys to states’ security
objectives. As China’s power capabilities increase, it will have the resources to further resist
Western norms and defend Chinese interests in the world. By acknowledging the logic of an
offensive realist like John Mearsheimer, one may take into account how security issues in the
Sino-American relationship may escalate and take a turn for the worst, leading to a manifestation
of the spoiler scenario.

The Supporter Scenario

Authors that fall under the supporter scenario emphasize trends of conflict management
and cooperation in both the World Trade Organization and South China Sea that mitigate the

38
39

Johnston, 7.
Mearsheimer, 160.
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chances of a trade war or military conflict. 40 In the second scenario, China will become a
supporter of the existing status quo, working within the existing rules of the game and
contributing its fair share to global governance while assuring other participants of its
commitment to Western norms. 41 Amitai Etzioni notes Chinese congruence with the
international community in his article, “Accommodating China”. As he writes, “China signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, joined the UN Security Council in unanimously
condemning North Korea’s 2012 ballistic- missile test and January 2013 nuclear test, and
conducted its first bilateral anti-piracy operation with the US Navy in the Horn of Africa at the
end of last year”. 42 These trends stand at odds with the spoiler scenario.

In “The Rise of China: Power, Institutions, and the Western Order”, John Ikenberry
similarly notes Chinese integration within the current global system by citing various
developments in the 21st century. He writes that “China is at the center of proliferating regional
and bilateral trade agreements and the rapid rise of intra-Asian trade. Its capital reserves are a
major source of American borrowing – indirectly financing Washington’s tax cuts and the Iraq
War. China has a leading role in the Six Party nuclear talks on North Korea”. He also writes,
“China’s commercial and energy ties are expanding around the world”. This point highlights that
in order to sustain its modernization, China will have to rely on the global liberal economy for
trade to secure the resources vital to domestic growth. 43

The supporter scenario challenges the theory of the rise and fall of great powers by
informing its argument through historical developments in the international political system. Not

40

Castel-Fodor, 237.
Schweller and Pu, 58.
42
Etzioni, 47.
43
Ikenberry, 89.
41
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all power transitions generate war or overturn the international order, such as when British
hegemony was ceded to the United States peacefully after World War II. 44 China will continue to
accommodate to the status quo of the order to maintain the benefits of trade and investment
offered by the global capitalist system. 45 When state actors see an incentive to participate in
global order, there is less of a chance for friction between the rising power and the hegemon and
more of a chance the rising power will adopt the practices of international society to become a
“normal” actor in the system.

China, for the most part, largely works within the economic constraints of the
international system created by the United States and has utilized the framework of the
international economic system to sustain overwhelming growth for over 30 years. In addition,
China has joined the international community in a number of institutions, which seems to
suggest that the rising power can be socialized into the “status quo”. The theory of socialization
asserts that “by involving new powers in the current structures and making them responsible
stakeholders, the US can bind those new powers into the current architecture, thus securing its
own influence”. 46

The socialization hypothesis resonates heavily with the supporter scenario, asserting that
the foundation of the American constructed liberal order satisfies the security interests of rising
powers to guarantee the durability of the status quo. As international actors rise, the incentives
gained from participation are attractive enough to ensure responsible behavior and a stake in
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upholding the current system. The supporter scenario relies on the theory of a fundamental shift
in the principles of the international system following the establishment of the liberal order.
Power politics and the utility of war have been replaced by economic thinking, and globalization
has led actors to become increasingly dependent on each other. While changing attitudes towards
war have downplayed the importance of power policy, its increasing irrelevance as a tool for
countries’ to utilize largely stems from the success of the United States in creating a global
economy that has since become institutionalized in the international system. The incentives
offered by the global economy have enhanced cooperation between state actors through the
opening of domestic markets and have delegitimized protectionist policies like those that brought
about the Great Depression in the U.S. and the collapsing market in Germany. In the global
liberal order, there is a stress on economic thinking. Liberalized trade and avoiding armed
conflict – in contrast to pouring money into military expenses and retaining closed markets – acts
as the crux of international stability. If China is indeed a supporter, this rationale influenced
Deng Xiaoping to adopt the economic reforms, which has increased Chinese dependence on the
global system since 1978 and will bind China’s rise to the structure of the international political
system.

Understanding the functions of the liberal order may lead one to believe that China will
continue its integration into the established international system. John Ikenberry argues that
China will accommodate itself to the global system, becoming a supporter of the order
established by the United States. First, he claims that “the more institutionalized and
encompassing the existing order is, the more difficult it is for a newly rising state to overturn
it”. 47 Bearing this in mind, the US emerged from World War II understanding the importance of
47
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restricting war to allow economic productivity as the key to securing its own interests while
meeting the needs of everyone else. The United States gave guarantees to participants in the
system through the formation of a variety of multilateral institutions that encompassed political,
economic, and military issues. Providing concrete incentives to allies offered an alternative
means of security by investing in a globalized order where actors have common interests as
opposed to their own national interests. As economic rationale developed, liberalized trade acted
as the staple of global security. Commenting on the structure of the global liberal order,
Ikenberry writes that the array of multilateral institutions and security pacts in the global liberal
order are elements of a political architecture that allows for states within the hegemonic order to
do business with each other, reducing surprises while allowing states to build long-term,
mutually beneficial relations. 48 Chinese foreign policy seems to suggest that it has been working
within this framework. Since 1978, China has become a member of various regional and
multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organization and the Association of South East
Nations Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea). China has also signed legally binding
agreements that come with WTO membership, and agreed to the 2002 China-ASEAN
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. Furthermore, China has shown a pattern of participating
in constructive diplomatic dialogues with trading partners to manage relations over economic
and security matters. All of these efforts suggest continuity in China’s integrationist strategy.

As Ikenberry sees it, the institutional depth and scope of the Western order will force
China to accommodate the system, regardless of any grievances it may have, even current U.S.
dominance. This is because China will not just be facing the hegemon if it tries to overturn the
system, but also the numerous “allies” the US has who benefit from the liberal characteristics of
48
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the order. In contrast to realist views, Ikenberry states, “this larger complex of democracies is not
simply an aggregation of GNP and defense spending, but more or less an institutionalized
political order”. 49 The supporter scenario offers an evaluation of China’s ascent to power by
considering the nature of the international system, a key element that frames how great powers
rise in the present day.

In the aftermath of World War II, the international system has become characterized by
democratic principles that act as a check on hegemony. Ikenberry argues that the global liberal
“is led by the United States in important respects but in a more profound sense it is an order that
has its own features and laws of motion”. 50 He describes this relationship as the system’s
“democratic complex”, which is an alliance of democracies that operate in a way that makes it
hard for the lead state, the United States, to pursue a hardline policy against other great powers
like China. 51 While the United States is the current hegemon, it is still a democracy that is
institutionally bound to other great powers and must restrain itself from asserting its hegemony
in ways that contradict democratic principles. Even though the most powerful actors define the
rules of international relations, the institutionalization of the liberal system has created
boundaries in relation to what the international community deems acceptable behavior. China is
not a democracy, but it has accepted Western capitalist principles of exchange, and as a result
has institutional ties to both the United States and other democracies that it does business with.
The process of Chinese integration is reflected in the two-way economic relationship fostered
between the state and international community since becoming a part of the global economy. As
a member of the global liberal order, China will be inclined to further bind itself to the status quo
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in order to sustain its benefits.

The supporter scenario notes that “the more institutionalized and encompassing the
existing order is, the more difficult it is for a newly rising state to overturn it”. 52 Given the
increasingly intertwined bond between China and international society, the supporter scenario
believes that China would be hard-pressed to establish an alternative order or resist conforming
to the global liberal order under the United States. A world characterized by the supporter vision
accepts the legitimacy of American ideological staples, such as democracy, human rights, and
capitalism in international society. The mainstream, Western attitude maintained by the
supporter scenario is that China will inevitably become a Western-style country. When it comes
to the prospect of democratization during China’s rise in the supporter vision, it is important to
consider the democratic complex of the system outlined by Ikenberry. The continuation of the
American global liberal order accepts “the notion that democracy is not only a universally valid
norm but also one that could be helpful in overcoming many political problems”. 53 The
plausibility of the supporter scenario manifesting itself is suggested by Chinese scholar
Xiaoming Zhang, who concludes that “China has to continue to change itself in order to
influence the world in its own way” and “it is not wise for China to challenge those values, such
as democracy and human rights, otherwise China is sure to be isolated in the Western dominated
international society”. 54

Evidence that Western values have percolated into Chinese society and will influence the
future transformation of the country can be found in Chinese scholarship. Scholars Yu Keping
and Yan Jian argue that “democracy is a good thing”, and Yu Xintian asserts her belief that
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human rights is a “universal value”. 55 For the more Western liberal-minded defenders of the
supporter scenario, the question is not whether China will become a democracy, but rather how
that transition will happen. 56 China may challenge the United States’ hegemony, but this will be
a peaceful and diplomatic process that engages the “democratic complex of the system” where
China has already accepted globalized Western norms of democracy and economic liberalization.

The Shirker Scenario

The third scenario can be labeled the shirker scenario and identifies how China is
unwilling to participate in all aspects of the global liberal order. As the supporter scenario
suggests, the rise of China has led to the expectation that the Chinese will take on a more
proactive role in the world. 57 However, a substantial amount of analytical literature on China’s
approach to global governance cites a strong disposition towards the principles of
noninterference and self-governance. 58 Fundamental political and cultural divisions between
China and the international community cause the country to resist all out acceptance of
dominant, Western oriented international norms. Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko point
out that “Beijing adheres to traditional norms of sovereignty and nonintervention in other states’
internal affairs”. 59 Following the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, Xiaoming Zhang notes that
governments and civil societies in the West have been pressuring China to liberalize its domestic
system in relation to the Western criteria, calling China’s sovereignty into question. 60 Despite
facing greater external pressures, China shows a reluctance to act as a “responsible stakeholder”
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in the global liberal order by resisting prevailing Western norms. The Chinese government “does
not subscribe to the prevailing Western norms of individualism, human rights, transparency,
democracy promotion, or humanitarian intervention”. 61 In addition, policymakers in China
continuously reiterate that foreign policy serves domestic goals of reform and development. 62
These overlapping observations about China’s strategic approach to the global system create a
persuasive platform for the scenario that sees China resisting proclaimed international norms in
the Western-centric global order.

China’s priority for domestic concerns allows for some interesting parallels to be drawn
on the consistency of Chinese shirking behavior and its foreign policy. There are several
citations within the literature that highlight China’s unwillingness to cooperate as a responsible
stakeholder. For example, Foot and Walker observe that China has adopted a minimalist
approach to climate protection, highlighted by the defensive response of the Chinese to emission
restrictions at the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009. 63 China articulated its stance as a
developing country, which prioritizes rapid economic growth over binding international
agreements that it sees as an encroachment upon state sovereignty. 64 Adopting a similar policy
approach to its stance on arms control negotiations, China stated it would participate in the fight
against international climate change “only after the major powers responsible for originally
creating these problems have made binding and costly commitments”. 65 The Chinese approach
to issues of international concern acts as evidence that suggests China’s preoccupation with
problems within its region and borders will cause it to neglect participating in solving challenges
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with global dimensions. Maintaining stability and legitimacy in the domestic realm are crucial
concerns of the Chinese government, and addressing security challenges related to these matter
will always be prioritized over accepting international standards that China does not see as
critical to its national interest. Freeriding on the progress of the global liberal order without
making the seemingly necessary contributions to maintain its survival will heavily impact the
orientation of the global system.

Rising powers are not eager to assume the responsibilities of managing the global
system. 66 By depicting China as a self-concerned actor preoccupied with modernization and
domestic issues that will see its interests best met by resisting the burdens of leadership while
continuing its participation in the global system, the shirker scenario refutes the logic of power
transition theory, which predicts that China will be a spoiler to the current foundation for order.
At the same time, the vision of an order presents a second path to China’s peaceful rise, different
from the rationale that underpins the socialization hypothesis of the supporter scenario, which
sees China adopting Westerns norms and becoming a responsible stakeholder. The shirker
scenario sees China as an inward looking state that prioritizes the mounting domestic challenges
it will face in the future, unconcerned with the maintenance of the global commons as according
to the American criterion. The shirker scenario raises the importance of Chinese sovereignty and
the question of how the country applies the principle of noninterference to global order.

The spoiler and supporter scenarios cite important findings that shape the contours of the
China debate, but are “half blind in ignoring the contingent nature of China’s future
intentions”. 67 The global system brought about by the shirker scenario is legitimized by a theory
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that counters core assumptions of the spoiler and supporter scenarios. It “is one more consistent
with a power diffusion process of system change than with one based on the transition of
power”. 68 Whereas the challenger scenario interprets coming poles in power capabilities between
China and the United States as recipes for war and system reconfiguration, the third scenario
where China acts as a shirker acknowledges that the core characteristics of global liberal order
can endure without retaining an emphasis on upholding international norms associated with
American hegemony. A diffusion of power that results in a transformation of the Western
oriented international political system to a negotiated liberal order is likely in a world of rising
non-Western actors and changing power relations. This vision challenges both realist
fascinations with tales of power transition emphasized by the spoiler scenario as well as the
overly optimistic predictions of China as a “gung-ho” promoter of American order based on the
supremacy of Western values and Chinese indebtedness to the economic structure of the global
liberal order seen in the supporter scenario. The shirker scenario argues that a rising great power
like China will act rationally rather than trying to overturn the structure or accept too many
obligations under the American model that could divert attention from domestic interests or drain
China’s crucial national resources. 69 China will seek to maximize its gains in the system that its
rise is embedded in, where, as Scheweller writes, “security is plentiful, territory is devalued, and
a robust liberal consensus exists”.70

As Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou suggests, rising powers are different from typical
stakeholders in the American-led order. She writes, “they do not share Western values as
traditional US allies have done” and “their political and economic systems are not similar to that
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of the US”. 71 China has maintained a successful path to development without fully subscribing to
the promulgated principles of the Washington Consensus. China sees “virtue in a strong state, a
disciplined society, stable economic growth, and national security over ‘imported’ notions of
human rights, democracy, and unregulated markets”. 72 The third scenario questions the
legitimacy of the socialization hypothesis by acknowledging the divergent interests of great
powers like China that are less concerned with supporting a system built around American
standards. While the supporter scenario predicts that China will adopt proper Western economic
liberalization and democratic governance along with allocating its resources towards the well
being of the ‘global commons’, the vision of a negotiated order argues that China can maintain
its integration into the global liberal order without complying with Western demands.

China will exhibit freeriding behavior, reaping the benefits of the global economy while
resisting conforming to international standards enunciated by organizations like the WTO that
China see as less crucial than its domestic interests. 73 The coming of what Schweller and Pu coin
as “nonpolarity” will be influenced by the United States’ reaction to this trend. Frustrated over
the costs of sustaining order without the support of rising powers like China, the United States
will withdraw from obligations to manage security in the global liberal order that it does not see
as crucial to its national interest. Without hegemonic enforcement, global order as constituted by
the United States will come to an end, leading to a de-emphasis on cooperation between states to
uphold international norms, specifically Western liberal norms that have become the rule of
thumb in global society. If order does persist, it will be without a primary organizer. 74 With this
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in mind, Chinese refusal of the United States’ call for a “G-2” alliance – where China acts as a
“co-managing partner on issues such as trade and currency reform, climate change, food safety,
peace and stability in East Asia, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and perhaps
even the Israeli- Palestinian conflict” 75 – is a crucial indicator of how China’s approach
according to the shirker scenario will lead to the deterioration of American world order and the
birth of an international political environment characterized by attitudes of laissez faire and
international strategies being coordinated at the national level.

When looking at arguments within the spoiler and supporter scenarios on their own, each
scenario offers significant evidence to justify their theoretical foundations of power transition or
socialization, two radically different conclusions. These two scenarios are largely formed by the
aggressive and integrative schools of thought that have emerged in the post-2008 era as a
response to Chinese policies. As the shirker scenario seems to suggest, the stark dichotomy
posited by the spoiler scenario and supporter scenario on China’s future role in the world
simplifies a complex reality. However, while the shirker scenario identifies how the sacrosanct
issue of sovereignty influences China’s integration into the global liberal order, its conclusions
on nonpolarity are challenged by the evidence of China moving away from principles of
noninterference in certain aspects of its policy and cooperating with the international community.
China contributes to peacekeeping missions, accept resolutions from the WTO dispute settlement
body in areas where its policy has not met international standards, and in 2014 signed an
agreement with the United States on limiting global carbon emissions. 76 This suggests that
China’s prioritization of national interest does not explicitly call for the country to apply
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principles of noninterference in every case of its relations with the international system. While
the shirker scenario also identifies key themes for assessing China’s strategy on the global stage
and how the world may move towards a negotiated liberal order, its argument is countered by
developments that suggest China’s activity may influence a multipolar order, rather than
nonpolar order, to develop.

China’s Activity in the World Trade Organization and South China Sea

The debate surrounding China’s future foreign policy strategy provides this thesis with a
foundation for conducting two case studies that focus on China’s behavior in the World Trade
Organization, Chapter 2, and in the South China Sea, Chapter 3. These two arenas are critical
focal points when considering the effect that China’s rise will have on global economic and
security norms. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 utilize alternative interpretations of China’s behavior in
the WTO and SCS to frame the debate on its overall strategy. While the first school of thought
emphasizes conflict, the second school of thought emphasizes conflict management. Both
schools of thought on China’s policy offer relevant evidence for understanding the future
trajectory of China’s relationship with the international political system, but they need to be
interpreted collectively. When taken together, the debate on China’s strategy and the role that the
country will play in the future raises three important questions. First, as it continues to rise, what
approach will China take in its relationship with the international political system? Second, can
the challenges to China’s relationship with the United States and the international community be
resolved to retain status quo stability? Third, if China can accomplish a peaceful rise, will there
be a reconfiguration of prevalent norms in the global liberal order? While only time will tell how
China’s rise will actually manifest itself, conducting case studies on the WTO and SCS may help
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to bring about a better understanding of Chinese policy and inform conclusions on its role in the
future.
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Chapter 2: China and the World Trade Organization

This chapter is about identifying alternative interpretations of China’s membership in the
World Trade Organization (WTO). There are varying interpretations of China’s membership in
the WTO that can be sorted into two schools of thought. The goal of this chapter is to analyze
China’s relationship with the global economic system based on the perspectives of relevant
authors and the evidence they use to support both sides of this argument. The first school of
thought identifies China’s membership in the World Trade Organization as a negative
development that threatens to undermine the global economic system upheld by the WTO. The
second school of thought addresses the question from a less selective utilization of the evidence
against China, considering the realities of the international political system to identify the roots
of conflict and examine how tensions are being managed between China and the international
community through the WTO.

Singling out China, Susan Aaronson claims that the country “could break the WTO
because it fails to enforce its own laws in a transparent, evenhanded manner and is willing to
ignore its international commitments to maintain power”. 77 Evaluating China’s membership in
the WTO and the frequency of disputes filed against the country, Aaronson states that Chinese
integration has been characterized by an inadequacy of governance. In a similar evaluation that
portrays China’s membership in a negative light, Henry Gao concludes that China has evolved
from passively accepting WTO rules. An increase in litigation by China in the post-2008 era
highlights a strategy of “aggressive” legalism that could “shake” the structure of the WTO. 78

77

Susan Aaronson, “Is China Killing the WTO?,” International Economy: The Magazine of International
Economic Policy, (2010): 41.
78
Henry Gao, “Elephant in the Room: Challenges of Integrating China into the WTO System,” Asian Journal of
WTO & International Health Law and Policy 6, no. 1 (2011): 141.

Farrell 31
China has filed 11 complaints over the possibility of foreign trade barriers and has been a
respondent for similar charges in 31 cases. Since China-Intellectual Property Rights in 2007,
China has acted as a respondent in 24 of the 31 cases filed against it. China has also filed 7 of its
11 complaints since initiating an anti-dumping investigation into poultry products from the
United States in 2009. 79 It is important to engage why there is an increasing frequency of
litigation being filed and what this trend means. From the perspective of this school of thought,
disputes involving China illustrate that the country’s role in the WTO could contribute to the
deterioration of trading partnerships among member states, undermining the goal of promoting
open and free trade enunciated by the World Trade Organization.

On the other side of the debate, authors utilize a different approach than the first school
of thought to reach conclusions on China’s relationship with the WTO. The second school of
thought emphasizes the historic context of disputes involving China and the institutional purpose
of the World Trade Organization. In contrast to the first school of thought, Gerald Chan believes
that China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization is the most peaceful development of the
post-Cold War Era. 80 China’s membership signifies a rising power seeing its interests being best
met by integrating into the architecture of the global liberal order. The adaptation of China’s
overall strategy to achieve its objectives within this context demonstrates that it has an interest in
maintaining the status quo to continue its economic growth without disrupting the international
economic system or seriously confronting trading partners like the United States. Building on
this point, legal scholar Kennan J. Castel Fodor notes that the increasing frequency in disputes
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being filed to the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB) highlights an effort by China and the
United States to resolve issues in their bilateral trading relationship. Even though there has been
an increase in litigation, academic scholars Adriaan Luyten and Sven Van Kerckhoven state that
there is little evidence to support the claim that China is disturbing how the World Trade
Organization functions. 81 In fact, China’s role in the WTO actually allows the organization to
serve its intended purpose of managing conflict. In the long term, the utilization of the WTO
DSB channels members’ divergent interests toward a long-term investment in the international
economic system. 82 From this perspective, historical context is key to explaining the issues
before jumping to conclusions about the adequacy of Chinese government adversely affecting
other WTO members and disrupting the global economy.

In the present day, measures relating to dumping, protectionism and the implementation
of international norms are the key topics in assessing China’s relationship with the global
economic system. These issues have historically been at the center of China’s relationship with
the global economy, and since China’s entrance into the WTO remain the dominant focal points
for authors offering input on China’s economic strategy. Historical context is key in analyzing
the issues of dumping, protectionism, and implementation of norms to identify what type of
behavior China is displaying in its relationship with the WTO. This chapter will introduce the
first school of thought’s interpretation to identify tensions in China’s relationship with the global
economic system. Next, the chapter will describe the evolution of China’s relationship with the
international economic system as a means to conceptualizing the second school of thought. This
will provide historical perspective for Aaronson’s argument. After doing so, the chapter will
examine the issues concerning China and the WTO from the perspective of the second school of
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thought. Conducting an evaluation of the subject matter will bring about a better understanding
of China’s strategy and help to enable conclusions on the nature of its relationship with the
WTO. Is China’s membership in the WTO a positive or negative development?

Complaints Against China in the World Trade Organization

Ka Zeng notes that trading disputes between China and the international community
focus on the Chinese government supporting domestic enterprises through tariffs, subsidies,
grants, refunds, and exemptions from taxes that either provide an unfair advantage to Chinese
exporters, or restrict foreign market access in China”. 83 Disputes concerning China’s measures
imposing anti-dumping and countervailing duties on products from the United States, EU and
their trade allies have increasingly been brought before the World Trade Organization dispute
settlement body (WTO DSB) in the post-2008 era. Between 2010 and 2012, the United States
filed three complaints to the WTO DSB, accusing China of violating anti-dumping and
countervailing duty (CVDs) clauses in a number of industries. In Dispute 414, electronic steel
from the U.S., and Dispute 427, chicken broiler products from the U.S., the WTO DSB ruled in
favor of the United States, finding China to be guilty of imposing import restrictions against U.S.
steel and chicken broiler products. 84 In Dispute 440, involving the same measures in the
automobile industry, a similar ruling found China to be in violation of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. 85 The fact that China was found to be in violation of WTO standards in each case in
the post-2008 period provides support for Aaronson’s belief that China continues to ignore both
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international and local laws pertaining to the international trading system and WTO
obligations. 86

In addition to these three cases, the United States and its allies have also brought two
cases to the WTO DSB relating to other protectionist policies enacted by the Chinese
government since the Western Financial Crisis. An essential part of receiving admittance to the
WTO is negotiating the most favored nation process and removing trade tariffs. Members of the
WTO dedicate themselves to upholding these economic reforms when signing the General
Agreement on Tariffs/Trade. The GATT Agreement is a critical WTO agreement that holds
signatories responsible for enforcing equal and open trade. A critical concern of WTO members
is receiving market access into the Chinese economy and receiving the same prices as China’s
domestic industries. As a WTO signatory, China is responsible for extending national treatment
to foreign industries. Skepticism over China’s industrial policy and the fact that key sectors of
the Chinese industry receive preferential treatment from the government – even though they are
competing in a globalized market – has led the United States and its allies to challenge perceived
protectionist policies in the Chinese economy using the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.

In 2009, the United States and several of its allies filed Dispute 394 to the WTO DSB, a
complaint against China over measures related to the exportation of various raw materials. 87 A
similar case was initiated by the United States, Europe, and Japan in 2012. The second dispute is
known as Dispute 431, measures related to the Exportation of Rare Earths. 88 Raw materials and
rare earths are resources critical to a variety of countries’ domestic industries. China is the
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world’s largest supplier of rare earths with a 90% share of global production. 89 These resources
fuel industrialized markets around the world. China can drastically affect the global market by
restricting the export of these resources. In the disputes, the United States asserted that, without
proper justification, China put export restraints on raw materials and rare earths key to both its
own energy needs and a multitude of U.S.-made products like wind turbines.

In each dispute filed, China was found guilty of the claims made by the United States and
other WTO members. The WTO DSB ruled that China was guilty of enacting policy
incompatible with the established legal framework for the international trading system, and
stated that China lacked an appropriate justification for its export restrictions. The close spacing
of the disputes supports the argument that China is both unwilling to respect the agreements it
signed in its Accession Protocol, and favors its own national objectives at the cost of the rest of
the world. China was found to be in violation of the GATT 1994 and its WTO obligations and
commitment in regards to its export quotas, export duties, and export licensing. Although China
cited its conservation policy in imposing the rare earth restrictions, the DSB critiqued China’s
lack of transparency in not reporting the reasons for, or details of, changes in its export policies.
The DSB also denied the legitimacy of China’s claim that it was following environmental
standards by imposing higher rates on foreign industries, but not its own.

The rare earth dispute was in close proximity to Japan’s purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands in 2012. Ownership of these islands disputed in the East China Sea is a contentious issue
in Sino-Japanese relations. The purchase of the islands may have prompted China to take its own
unilateral action against Japan, along with the U.S and EU for supporting Japan’s position.
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Restricting the import of crucial rare earths to the targeted countries for political reasons
negatively affects their domestic industries and contradicts WTO policy. Not only do export
restrictions provide a competitive advantage to Chinese domestic industries by forcing foreign
industries to buy rare earth at a higher price, but also affect a significant share of trade,
employment, and production in targeted countries. 90 In each case, Chinese policy is indicative of
behavior that undermines WTO norms. Export restrictions are in clear violation of the GATT
Agreement WTO members are obligated to uphold. Furthermore, the use of export restrictions
by the Chinese government is an example of the PRC coupling political issues with economic
diplomacy to leverage the U.S., EU, and Japan into complying with its demands. Based on the
obligations of WTO members outlined by the GATT Agreement, China’s behavior in these
instances violates the terms it accepted when joining the WTO.

Questioning China’s Domestic Bureaucracy

In Dispute 427, anti-dumping and countervailing duties concerning chicken broiler
products, the United States cited evidence of what the first school of thought would call
“inadequate governance”, targeting the bureaucratic efficiency of the PRC from multiple fronts.
In the report submitted to the WTO DSB, the United States claimed “improper dumping and
injury determination, improper reliance on the facts available, failure to provide access to
relevant information, insufficient explanation of the basis for the determinations, absence of
proper analysis of the effects of imports under investigation, and absence of objective
determination of causality” on the part of the Chinese government. 91 The United States argued
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that China had caused harm to its domestic industry through misinformed calculations in
industrial policy and a lack of bureaucratic aptitude to justify its measures.

The performance of the Chinese state in regards to meeting international standards in a
variety of disputes has been interpreted by the first school of thought as a disregard for the rule
of law that the Chinese agreed to uphold when joining the WTO. As with other disputes filed in
recent years, issues pertaining to intellectual property rights serve as a platform for an argument
against the compliance of China’s domestic institutions in meeting WTO obligations. The
intellectual property issue enforces Susan Aaronson’s point that China has a “culture of
noncompliance”, where bad actors set the norm, and China’s behavior is inherently contradictory
to agreements it signed, due to the fact it refuses to build bureaucratic efficacy. 92 The first school
of thought believes the strategy China has taken thus so far in pursuing its national development
undermines the overall structure of the World Trade Organization.

The frequency of disputes within the World Trade Organization targeting China for
dumping and enacting protectionist policies illustrates that members of the international
community are skeptical of the lengths that China takes to fulfill the obligations of WTO
membership. George Bush enunciated the Western perspective in 2002 when stating that China
“has the right and responsibility to fashion and enforce the rules of open trade”. 93 Yet, charges
by the United States and claims made by Aaronson suggest the Chinese government has not
made an adequate effort to create an effective institutional structure for maintaining the
commitments of its WTO membership.
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In the 2013 USTR report to Congress, intellectual property rights (IPR) was the first
priority issue cited by the U.S on China’s WTO compliance. 94 Given the fact that America is one
of the most, if not the most, technologically innovative and advanced economies in the world, it
has a keen interest in protecting the assets of a highly specialized economic sector that sets it
apart from the rest of the world. Therefore, protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights has evolved into a critical issue in the age of globalization to guard advanced economies
against the costs of piracy. While the Chinese leadership claims it has made an effort to address
the protection of IPR, pirating continues to grow. In the 1990’s, the U.S estimated that pirating
losses in China were around 2 billion dollars a year, and foregone sales from IPR theft is seen by
the U.S as a critical challenge to the American economy. A study on intellectual property theft in
in 2009 estimated the United States suffered 48 billion dollars in losses due to IPR infringement
in China. 95 More recent studies have indicated that the US suffers a loss of between 150 billion
and 240 billion USD annually in China. 96 As a result of large-scale intellectual property theft, the
Chinese government has come under attack for its ability to implement and enforce the critical
international norm of protecting intellectual property rights. In 2007, the United States filed
Dispute 362 through the WTO DSB, requesting the WTO begin an investigation into the
enforcement and protection of intellectual property rights by the Chinese government. Taken
together with other charges filed by WTO members against China, a negative conclusion in
Dispute 362 may suggest that China has not made a serious effort to adapt to the standards of the
World Trade Organization, supporting the claims of the first school of thought.
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The Historic Context of Disputes

Understanding why disputes concerning China are a central focus in the World Trade
Organization requires historical context before coming to a conclusion on China’s relationship
with the global economic system. China’s evolution into a major economic player in the
international system resulted from an ongoing process of political and economic reform initiated
by the Chinese leadership since 1978 to bring the country into accordance with the economic
norms of the global liberal order. The normalization of relations between China and the United
States’ as a result of the Nixon-Mao rapprochement in 1972 set the stage for China’s
reformation. Prior to rapprochement, the People’s Republic of China was isolated from the
international community: 1949-1969 in U.S.-China relations is identified as the containment
period. 97 The most crucial aspect of the containment period is the trading embargo the United
States and its allies imposed upon China. 98 The trade embargo barred the Chinese from
developing trade relationships with the international community like those of its Asian
neighbors. As a result of U.S. economic warfare, China was isolated from the liberal trading
structure developing around the United States during the first half of the Cold War. Whereas
other Asian countries with Western trading ties began to grow through export-led development,
China was the one major country with a domestic economy completely isolated from the
international economic system till reforms began in 1978. 99

Without access to international markets, the Maoist government took an autarkic
approach to addressing China’s economic problems. The state-planned economic model made
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initial steps towards industrializing the agrarian based economy, but state orchestrated policies
like the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution adversely affected both the country’s
population and economy. The stagnation of the Chinese economy acted as a barrier to securing
Chinese autonomy: China’s ability to both develop and defend itself in relation to the rest of the
world dwindled as America and its allies’ relative power and security grew from the economic
success of globalized markets in the liberal order.

Rapprochement in the 1970’s extended China an invitation to take a more active role in
the order taking shape around the United States. By the end of the Maoist Era, the Chinese
leadership faced political and economic crisis. 100 Abandoning an approach of economic selfreliance in an effort to stimulate domestic economic growth and raise the standard of living, the
Chinese government took steps to decentralize the economy and established several economic
zones to attract foreign investment, increase exports to other countries, and import advanced
technology previously inaccessible in China. 101 The goal of these reforms was to promote
foreign trade and increase the productivity of the Chinese economy by gaining access to the
trading architecture of the global economic system established under the liberal order. Above all,
the reforms marked the beginning of a commitment by the Chinese leadership to modernizing the
Chinese state through the opportunities of international trade. Doing so would require a drastic
reconfiguration of China’s domestic institutions.

Under Deng Xiaoping, the leadership of the People’s Republic of China adopted an
integrationist approach to maximize its economic gains in the global liberal order. China
reoriented domestic economic and political structures to stress greater conformity with
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international norms already established by the United States and other market economies.
China’s reforms culminated in its entrance to the World Trade Organization in 2001. Around the
time when the GATT was reformed into the WTO (1993-94), China abolished export subsidies,
published trade regulations, unified its foreign exchange value, and initiated progressive tariff
reductions. Two stock exchanges were created in Shanghai(1990) and Shenzhen(1991), the legal
framework for formal joint ventures was introduced to act as a vehicle for foreign investment,
and the Company Law in 1993 began an era of legally defined corporations which stimulated the
restructuring of the state sector into a shareholding system. 102 The new development model in
Shanghai pioneered by Zhu Rongji combined public investment in infrastructure with reduced
transaction costs for private and international investors, demonstrating further conformity to the
demands of China’s major trading partners in the WTO. 103 In 1992, China agreed to the Market
Access Agreement, giving the United States greater access to Chinese markets and exposing
domestic industries to intensified foreign competition. 104 The furthering of the 1978 reforms
highlights the decision by China to continue implementing policies of adaptation to the
capitalistic norms of the liberalized global economy as it pursued economic reform.
All of these changes were made to meet the requirements of WTO membership. 105
Capitalist countries were specifically concerned about the role of the state in the economy and
called for further opening of the Chinese goods and services market. 106 In 1995, the United
States gave China a memo listing areas of U.S. concern. Despite widespread Chinese reforms,
the memo covered a variety of issues including tariffs, market access, trading rights, investment
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policy, and China’s status as a developing country. 107 The aforementioned issues framed the
negotiation of concessions China needed to make before becoming a member of the WTO. In
order to join the WTO, China would have to address the concerns in its bilateral trade
relationship with the United States and other market economies.

Continuing reforms to gain WTO membership was beneficial to the PRC in two ways.
First, the WTO is dedicated to promoting trade and removing market barriers. WTO principles
such as most favored nation (MFN) status help establish permanent, normal trade relations with
other members and remove trade barriers that would make China’s economic strategy more
effective. Therefore, China continued to employ a strategy that stressed adapting to foreign
partners standards as it sought to meet economic interests and gain market access for its exports.
Second, WTO membership provides China with a rule-based forum, the DSB, for dealing with
an increasing number of bilateral trading problems with its partners. 108 Designation as a nonmarket economy (NME) and non-membership in the GATT/WTO subjected China to
discriminatory measures such as “conditional MFN and discriminatory anti-dumping duties
determined through third-country pricing” when dealing with issues in its bilateral trade
relationships. This influenced China to accelerate its efforts to join the WTO.

In addition to signing 60 legally binding agreements (like the GATT 1994, and TRIPs)
the Chinese agreed to make multiple concessions to gain membership in the World Trade
Organization. 109 By the time it joined, China had radically reformed its legal, bureaucratic, and
economic structures:
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From 1979 to 2000, China adopted hundreds of laws and regulations to govern foreign
economic relations. It established special courts and other dispute-resolution
mechanisms…foreigner-friendly changes were made in banking, communications,
transportation, and so on. 110
Following the terms of the Accession Agreement, the Chinese leadership repealed a number of
laws inconsistent with WTO standards and accepted the task of now implementing these
standards. As a member, China agreed to drastically lower tariff rates, remove a number of
nontariff barriers (such as import and export licensing and quotas) to foreign imports, abolish
subsidies for producers, allow foreign enterprises market access in sensitive areas, treat domestic
and foreign products on the same terms, and improve its protection of intellectual property
rights. 111

Given the trajectory of China’s economic growth, market economies feared China’s
effect on their share of the global economy. To assuage fear of Chinese products dramatically
reducing their global market share, China was also forced to agree to the Transitional productspecific safeguard mechanism (TPSSM). The TPSSM allowed WTO members to impose import
restrictions on China until December 2013 without meeting the standard set by the WTO
Agreement on Safeguards. 112 Chan points out that the WTO Agreement on Safeguards allows for
import restriction only when a country’s industry faces “serious injury”; the TPSSM allows
WTO members to discriminate against Chinese products under the pretext of “market
disruption”. 113 Even so, China had to undergo review each year until 2010 under a Transitional
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Review Mechanism (TRM) to evaluate the country’s compliance and implementation of the
Accession Agreement. 114

Continued designation as a NME and the terms such as TPSSM and TRM attached to
China’s Accession Agreement provide market economies like the United States with methods for
taking action against the Chinese despite WTO membership. However, the Chinese leadership
was not completely at the mercy of Western demands when acceding to the WTO. China was not
forced to make the transition to a fully Westernized economy before gaining membership in one
of the core institutions of the liberal international trading system. Instead, the Chinese economy
drew on the strengths of global trade, complementing its national interest in developing the
domestic market without compromising the role of the state in accomplishing this task. What
emerged from China’s accession was a competitive economic model, both state-directed and
globally marketized. 115

Examining China’s WTO Membership from an Alternative Perspective

The literature pinpoints the elements of China’s distinct model known as the “Beijing
Consensus” that developed out of its integration into the global economy. China’s economic
model is characterized by five elements that emphasize the role of the state as a mediator in
economic affairs. The Beijing Consensus promotes incremental reform rather than full market
transition, innovation and experimentation, export-led growth, state capitalism, allocating
resources to state-owned enterprises, and authoritarianism. 116 As the Beijing Consensus shows,
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the Chinese government pursues a strategy of passing various measures to manage the effects of
globalization on domestic producers and consumers. The Beijing Consensus is distinct from the
Western model endorsed by the global liberal order known as the Washington Consensus, which
emphasizes a free market approach rather than state planning. Since it is distinct from the liberal
norm, the approach of the Beijing Consensus has created a tension between China and critical
perspectives from the first school of thought that see its resistance to Westernization as a
challenge to the global liberal order. Ka Zeng notes that Washington’s focus on Chinese
industrial policy and the Chinese government’s continued support for domestic industries needs
to be viewed against Beijing’s continued heavy involvement in the economy. 117

The United States has been the main instigator of disputes against China since its
admission to the WTO in 2001. The United States Trade Representative claims the reason for
bringing 15 cases to the WTO against China – more than twice the number brought against any
other member – is to accomplish two goals: to bring about a resolution of the key trade issues in
the U.S.-China trade relationship, and to influence the Chinese to act as a fully accountable and
mature participant in the WTO trading system. 118 However, it is important to remember that the
benefits the U.S seeks from its trading relationship with China are an even more fundamental
component of American policy towards China in the global economic realm. The USTR reports
that a critical goal of American WTO policy, as it has always been, is “to vigorously pursue
increased benefits for U.S. businesses, workers, farmers, ranchers and service providers from our
trade and economic ties with China…the Administration will use all available tools to achieve
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these objectives”. 119 Whether it is China or the United States, a country’s national interest is at
the heart of its foreign policy approach. That being said, the chapter will now shift to an
alternative perspective for assessing China’s WTO membership.

The first school of thought makes sweeping claims which may not be completely
unfounded, but they are overly one sided by ignoring the context of the disputes involving China
in the WTO. Gerald Chan interprets China’s entrance into the global liberal institution as one of
the most peaceful developments of the post-Cold war era. Consideration of Chan’s assertion
reveals a view that sees China’s accession as an instance of a rising power seeing its interests
best being met by joining the institutionalized global order despite the competitive advantage of
status quo actors. China’s membership in the World Trade Organization provides a platform for
managing trading issues between status quo actors and the Chinese through the multilateral
architecture of the international political system. In regards to the institutionalized framework
China is rising into, analysis from the second school of thought on China’s relationship with the
WTO seems to be correct. In contrast to the first school of thought, Luyten and Van Kerckhoven
concludes there is very little evidence that China is disturbing the function of the WTO. 120 From
this perspective, Aaronson’s remarks seem to be overstated. China is not “breaking” the World
Trade Organization, it is utilizing the institution to advance its own interests just like any other
country. China’s interests in the area of international trade and investment are increasingly linked
to acceptance and promotion of international norms. 121 The disputes show China is doing more
to improve its adherence to WTO standards while simultaneously retaining the Beijing
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Consensus: in the 11 disputes that have been resolved, China has implemented all findings. 122
The WTO has provided the United States and China a basis for settling issues in their trading
relationship in a constructive manner that allows the United States to leverage the Chinese
government into developing its policies in accordance with the framework provided by the
organization. These points illustrate the overall peaceful development of China, as a rising
power, incorporating behavior that supports the foundation of the global economic system into
its strategic interest.

Since the Nixon-Mao rapprochement and the end of the Maoist period, China has
undergone a transformation in its market structure to enter into the liberal order established by
the United States. While Mao’s policy sought to avoid dependence on foreign markets and
capital to retain China’s sovereignty in the domestic realm, Deng’s strategy called for China to
draw upon the resources of the outside world by pursuing joint development and stressing
conformity with the global economic framework. 123 China’s transformation from ‘Maoism’ to
‘Dengism’ leading up to acceptance of the obligations of WTO membership suggests willingness
to participate in the liberal order, and the norms associated with global trade. China’s compliance
with international norms can be better understood by looking at the disputes where these
problems are raised. Taken as a whole, the disputes illustrate specific instances of China’s
behavior in the context of the global liberal order’s strategic environment. An analysis of China’s
relationship with the WTO examines the underlying dimensions to Aaronson’s claims by using
specific disputes. The goal is to illustrate that China’s membership is not “killing” the World
Trade Organization, but actually allowing the WTO to function to its intended purpose.
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Aaronson concludes that a “broken China need not destroy the WTO”, but fails to
consider the historical progression of China’s relationship into the international community and
the roots of present day frictions. While the World Trade Organization is a Western constructed
institution, Aaronson’s argument is largely built from a Western perspective and geared around
the extent to which China’s WTO membership affects, and should serve, U.S. interests. In doing
so, she fails to realize several components of the issue. The purpose of the World Trade
Organization is to promote multilateralism and consider the broader interests and strategies of
other member states. The WTO DSB provides China with a framework for adapting to the global
environment, refining elements of the Beijing Consensus to make sure the economic strategy
retains legitimacy in the eyes of China’s trading partners.

Even though China is not supposed to receive full market economy (FME) status until
2016, and Washington constantly attacks Beijing’s trading practices, over 51 countries including
many of China’s regional partners such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations recognize
China as a FME despite the hegemonic criterion of the “Washington Consensus”, the dominant
economic strategy in the global liberal order. 124 This suggests that other observers may not
perceive China WTO membership in the same way as Aaronson’s school of thought. To the
school of thought Gerald Chan falls under, China’s membership in the World Trade Organization
is a positive development in the historical process of Chinese integration into the international
community.
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Aaronson’s understanding of China’s WTO membership leads her to believe that the
international trading system is deteriorating, but Chan’s perspective argues that relations between
actors in the global economic system are actually progressing in a positive direction due to
conflict management being funneled towards the WTO. Not only does the WTO dispute
settlement body allow for bilateral disputes to be resolved through third-party arbitration, but it
also has guided China’s growth and foreign policy into compliance with international norms
despite continued discrimination from other WTO members. In areas where tensions persist, the
divergent interests of China and status quo actors like the United States are being effectively
handled. The WTO DSB serves as an outlet for the U.S and China to deal with trade frictions and
actively manage dispute in a way that transcends the “winner-take-all approach” of bilateral
trade negotiations by providing third-party mediation to issues framed by the self-interest of
individual actors.

Dumping Charges and Discrimination

Chan’s understanding of China’s WTO membership suggests that issues pertaining to
disputes involving China may be more complex than the first school of thought lets on. Why
might China enact anti-dumping restrictions against U.S. imports despite WTO rules? Since
Chinese trade with the outside world has taken off, trading partners have repeatedly challenged
the role of the Chinese state in the market. Chan illustrates the magnitude of the dumping issue in
China’s bilateral relationships by noting that dumping charges against China have skyrocketed.
Before 1979, China’s exports accounted for less than $10 billion and no dumping charges had
been levied against the country. Between 1979 and 2005 when Chan’s book was published, 33
countries had initiated a total of 544 investigations and taken unilateral action against 4,000
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Chinese export products. 125 China’s accession protocol allows members to initiate anti-dumping
investigations without strictly comparing domestic prices in China when the Chinese producers
under investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the
industry. 126 This puts the dumping disputes in the post-2008 period in perspective. Utilizing
methods condoned by the World Trade Organization, status quo actors in the global liberal order
can enact policies against China to protect their economies from Chinese competition and benefit
their domestic industries, even though China is a WTO member.

Countries enact dumping investigations against China on the basis that it is exporting its
lesser-quality products to foreign markets at a lower price than it costs to manufacture them,
providing Chinese products with a competitive advantage over their own products. When taking
a moment to reflect upon what dumping a product actually means, one may question why any
rational actor would strategically export products at a loss. The reason dumping investigations
are frequently filed against China is that state directed capitalism subsidizes part of the costs for
crucial domestic industries, much to the dissatisfaction of other market economies. China’s non
market economy (NME) status and the contours of its Accession (TPSSM) make it easy to file
and win dumping disputes against China. 127 By pairing anti-dumping investigations with
countervailing duties charges that target Chinese subsidy programs, the United States and
successfully used the WTO DSB to force China to remove market barriers in recent years, such
as in Disputes 414 and 427.

Meanwhile, the market economies restrict Chinese products from entering their own
markets. In addition to utilizing the framework of the World Trade Organization to target aspects
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of the Beijing Consensus, countries conduct investigations and take action against China to
“level the playing field”. The reason is that there is a large payoff for a country that accuses
China of dumping. Even though China is now entitled to the benefits of WTO membership, the
WTO Antidumping Agreement allows members to continue to unilaterally enact policy against
China if a country accuses China of dumping products. 128 Countries can accuse China of
illegitimate trading practices without having to verify the legitimacy of their claims to the WTO,
so that they can enact safeguards and extract concessions through “import relief measures”,
otherwise known as higher tariffs, against products from Chinese industries. For instance, in
2009 the Obama administration enacted safeguards against Chinese tires to restrict their import
in response to complaints from the U.S. Steelworkers Union. 129 The national self-interest of
China’s trading partners is part of the reason why the Chinese government is frequently targeted
in dumping disputes. China’s utilization of import restrictions in Disputes 414, 427 and 440
against the United States can be explained as a reaction to discriminatory practices against
Chinese products that China still faces from foreign markets despite WTO membership. China’s
historical and present day role as a scapegoat for dumping charges explains its utilization of the
same measures employed by WTO members against Chinese products.

Despite Aaronson’s claims of inadequate governance, China’s has developed its
institutional abilities to deal with charges, emphasizing a willingness to conform to international
standards. Upon WTO admission, China established the Fair Trade Bureau of Imports and
Exports with eight offices and forty staff members. The FTB is a sub-organization of the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), the administrative channel
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that oversaw the bilateral and multilateral negotiations of the MFN process critical to China’s
WTO membership. Since Chinese companies are frequently accused of dumping, the FTB serves
the purpose of directing those companies’ response to dumping charges. 130 Given MOFTEC’s
continued engagement with trade issues like dumping over the years, the creation of the Fair
Trade Bureau shows the Chinese government’s intent to effectively deal with dumping charges
and address resulting discriminatory policies filed by trading partners. 131 China’s strategic
development of domestic institutions demonstrates conformity to international norms, but also
shows how doing so can dissuade the global trading community from slighting China’s national
interest.

Not only does China actively seek to manage the dumping problem on its own accord,
but it has followed the recommendations of the WTO dispute settlement body when the
international community has challenged its reactive strategy. After both Dispute 414 and Dispute
427, China implemented the DSB resolutions, pointing to compliance with DSB findings and
international obligations. In the long run, this suggests that the Beijing Consensus can coexist
with the liberal order if China actively continues to implement changes in the domestic realm to
meet the standard enunciated by the DSB and adjust protectionist policies. At the same time,
China can utilize the WTO DSB to critique members of the WTO that are guilty of similar
practices.

Western Protectionism

Evaluating China’s role in antidumping measures, countervailing duties, wind power
subsidies, along with the raw materials and rare earths disputes, the United States Trade
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Representative report in 2013 asserted that China’s polices “limit market access for imported
goods, foreign manufacturers and foreign service suppliers”, while offering “substantial
government guidance, resources and regulatory support to Chinese industries”. 132 However, the
United States has also restricted Chinese market access and provides benefits and a competitive
advantage to its own industries by enacting safeguards against Chinese exports, such as in the
aforementioned U.S Steel dispute. 133 This is a clear illustration of safeguard measures being
taken by the U.S. to limit the access of the NME designated China in the American market.

Like the dumping issue, Chinese protectionism should be considered in light of the
foreign barriers China often encounters in the international trading arena. The U.S. and EU
markets utilize a number of environmental barriers against the Chinese to prevent Chinese
products from gaining access to their markets. Chinese exporters must comply with international
and foreign environmental standards and regulations to export their products. Yet, China is still
developing the capacity of its domestic institutions and Chinese exporters are still acquiring the
capabilities to meet international standards. 134 In the raw materials dispute initiated in 2009,
China cited the reason for its export restrictions was to “reduce pollution” and “protect human
health” while seeking to moderate the export of exhaustible natural resources. 135 Chinese
rhetoric implies an understanding of established norms in the liberal international system and
could even point to a strategy of justifying protectionist policies using the same jargon of
“green” language utilized by Western countries. China’s justification, to be abiding by
international environmental standards, suggests a reactive strategy to deal with barriers it faces in
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other markets and discriminatory measures it has often been subjected to.

Even though China’s restrictions are in part reactive to continued discrimination, it is
even more fundamental to consider how national interests frame the behavior of members in
multilateral institutions. Like its trading partners, China is trying to strike a balance between
economic nationalism and globalism in its approach to the international economy, arguing that
other major countries intervene in trade through financial and industrial policies too. 136 Even if
states participate in multilateral institutions, national interest dominates the considerations of
actors in the international political-economic system and frames the underlying aims of a
country’s policy.

Regardless of varying perceptions of China’s intentions in the disputes, China’s
compliance with WTO rulings in the aftermath of each dispute suggests that the country is still
integrating within the global economic system while developing the capacity to advance its
national interest in the established framework of the global economic system. After the DSB
ruled on China-Raw materials, China removed export restraints on several raw material inputs of
key interest to the U.S. steel, aluminum and chemicals industries after the United States won a
dispute settlement case against China at the WTO. 137 Furthermore, in 2010 when the United
States brought a case to the WTO on China’s subsidization of wind power equipment, the PRC
ended state subsidies before the DSB Panel was established. 138 In 2014 when the China-rare
earths dispute was settled, China stated that it would implement the recommendations of the
DSB in a manner consistent with its WTO obligations.
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Developing an Intellectual Property Rights Regime in China

China’s decision to implement WTO rulings in each of the aforementioned disputes
suggests that the 2008 disputes are not as severe as Aaronson makes them out to be. In fact, they
suggest a more evident trend of China’s development and strategy being influenced by
international norms. A progressive management of disputes with deep historical roots through
the WTO suggests that China is developing its domestic system to stress greater conformity with
international norms since joining the organization in 2001. For example, the issue of intellectual
property rights has historically been important in the U.S-Sino relationship, and it provides a way
of judging the bureaucratic efficacy of the PRC. Since intellectual property rights were
considered common property under Mao, China has had to build a legal and bureaucratic
structure to support IPR norms from scratch. The Chinese government followed U.S advice by
enacting laws and regulations to bring its domestic structure in line with outside standards.
However, corruption, an inadequate legal system, and local protectionism generated friction over
Chinese efficacy. Despite overall American benefits resulting from Chinese trade, the United
States has threatened China multiple times (in 1991,1994, and 1996) with trade sanctions if it did
not pay for the costs of piracy. 139

In 2007, the United States filed a complaint through the WTO dispute settlement body
known as China-Intellectual Property Rights, citing measures by the Chinese that were
inconsistent with the guidelines of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), a key WTO agreement. 140 Signatories must protect a variety of information including
“patents, copyrights and trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs and trade
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secrets”. 141 Agreeing to adopt TRIPS upon accession called for China to develop the proper legal
and institutional structures. Furthermore, signing the TRIPS agreement called for the Chinese
government to assume the responsibility of confiscating pirated goods and imposing civil and
criminal penalties costly enough to deter actors within the Chinese border from committing
piracy. 142

According to the China-IPR summary, the U.S. pursued consultation on the matter based
on concerns over the institutional effectiveness of the IPR regime in China. In its complaint, the
United States claimed the Chinese criminal system lacked an adequate threshold for enforcing
the regulations of intellectual property rights, and the Chinese bureaucracy failed to implement
TRIPS obligations regarding the confiscation of goods unauthorized for commercial sale within
China. 143 The conclusions reached by the dispute settlement body were mixed. On the one hand,
China was found guilty on issues of copyright protection and in regards to confiscation and
disposal of unauthorized goods. However, the DSB noted that the U.S. assertion that China did
not have an adequate threshold for handling criminal practices in its domestic system had no
basis. Rather than reaching a one-sided conclusion, the dispute settlement body utilized the
TRIPS to scrutinize the legality of each American claim. The DSB did not support the U.S. claim
that China had not taken measures to establish an adequate threshold for dealing with practices
of IPR infringement. 144 While the IPR regime is not as strong in China as the standard set by
advanced economies and the WTO, the DSB’s resolution supports the idea that China has taken
steps to create institutions for implementing international norms.
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Contrary to U.S claims, the Department for WTO Affairs and reforms made in the
Chinese legal system since engagement began are two illustrations of the Chinese state’s active
role in creating necessary institutions. Established in 2001, the Department of WTO Affairs is
responsible for making sure that China carries out its promises to WTO Agreements on Goods
and Services. Although it is a relatively new institution, the Department of WTO Affairs is
another sub-organ of MOFTEC. The Department has six offices and 48 staff members dedicated
to instituting domestic laws in line with WTO principles. 145 The institution’s purpose can be
directly applied in the IPR case, but also demonstrates a broader picture of China developing the
domestic capabilities to implement international standards.

The Chinese leadership makes an effort to meet the expectations of WTO standards, and
the initiation of the dispute illustrates that there is room for long-term improvement. The DSB
found China’s Copyright Law and Customs Measures to be inconsistent with the TRIPS
agreement and recommended that China conform its Copyright Law and Customs Measures to
those obligations. 146 China was given 12 months to implement proper domestic changes.
According to the report, the Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s Congress
approved amendments to the Chinese Copyright Law on March 19, 2010, and the State Council
adopted a decision to reform the Regulations for Customs Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights. 147 Three years after the dispute was initiated, both countries notified the DSB of the
Agreed Procedures on April 8 2010.

China has not been challenged on willingness to abide by TRIPS through the WTO since
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the dispute. The WTO DSB played an active role in resolving a prominent issue in China’s
bilateral trading relationships. While China is compelled to implement DSB findings, WTO
membership also provided China with political protection from the U.S taking unilateral action
to resolve the issue. Whereas Chinese reluctance to uphold WTO agreements can be argued in
the raw material and rare earth disputes, it looks like China is supporting intellectual property
right norms despite American skepticism. This case suggests an increase in China’s support for
international norms since 2008. As the country modernizes further, the Chinese economy will
move beyond the export-led growth model and come to resemble other advanced economies. 148
Innovation in the Chinese economy will make upholding intellectual property norms increasingly
important to the country’s national interest. A variety of Chinese officials, businesses and
academics have engaged in high frequency dialogue with the Global Intellectual Property Center
and U.S. intellectual property experts to build an effective legal and regulatory framework for
intellectual property rights. 149 All of these signs point to management of trading issues by the
Chinese leadership occurring within the context of its WTO membership. In an instance of the
WTO functioning effectively, Aaronson’s claims of China “breaking” the WTO do not seem to
hold up. 150 China has accepted implementing intellectual property rights, and accomplishing this
task will require continued engagement by the state. Greater coordination by the central
leadership and local governments to address issues such as corruption and bridging the gap
between legal and regulatory standards will lead to constructive handling of the challenges
related to the international community’s expectations.
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China’s Utilization of the Dispute Settlement Body

Authors from the first school of thought see an increase in litigation being filed by China
as signs of an aggressive strategy. The second school of thought argues that it signals conflict
management. Utilizing the WTO dispute settlement body provides members with a means to
compromising issues in bilateral trading relationships through a third-party institution.
International norms are developed in multilateral contexts that involve large numbers of
countries, and decisions are made by consensus. Third party, international legal bodies like the
WTO Dispute Resolution Mechanism enunciate the specific standards of the norm regime in the
international trading system. 151 Disputes are initiated when a country’s domestic industry is
negatively affected by the policies of another state, typically as a result of suspected
noncompliance with WTO agreements. As the disputes show, utilizing the World Trade
Organization can force China to comply with the DSB’s findings if it is found guilty and
provides a release valve for China’s trading partners to vent frustrations. 152 China has also
benefitted from membership by gaining a voice in an international institution to defend its
interests when Western countries criticize Chinese policies based on their own-self interest and
conceptions of how its economic system should work. Because this is the system China is
joining, one component of its strategy is reacting to the tendency of the United States and its
allies to continuously target the China’s economic strategy despite its WTO membership. The
importance is that the dynamic is contained by the WTO.

As the chapter shows, China is willing to implement WTO DSB rulings when found
guilty. Therefore, it is extreme to state that “China has evolved from a passive ‘taker’ of the
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existing rules to a country that will ‘shake‘ the rules for its own interests. 153 China has been in
the position of disadvantage since it began integration and has been faced with the task of
learning the rules of the “game” in the international arena. There is an institutionalized set of
norms China must appear to be in line with when pursuing its national interest. However, China
can utilize the WTO DSB to serve and defend its national interest. Just like any other WTO
member, China is entitled to utilize the WTO DSB when it perceives the policies of other actors
are causing harm to the Chinese economy, despite the fact that the first school of thought
interprets China’s dispute initiation as a sign of aggression. While China will follow most of the
rules, it will also seek to master the intricacies of the WTO ruling system to protect its
interests. 154

China has increasingly resorted to utilizing the WTO as a way of critiquing the United
States on its own terms. China has initiated charges only against the United States and EU, and
an overwhelming share of the disputes where China is the complainant have involved it charging
the U.S. and EU with comparable complaints such as dumping that have been persistent in the
trading relationship 155. Recall the Fair Trade Bureau of Imports and Exports. The office is
responsible for investigating imports and determining whether anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, or
protective measures are applicable to foreign products. After joining the WTO, China is now
able to utilize its legal framework to advance a claim at the WTO to determine if trading partners
are engaging in dumping practices or if foreign countries are enforcing discriminatory policies
on Chinese products inconsistent with WTO obligations. The purpose is ensuring that Chinese
companies enjoy fair trade in the global economy despite repeated castigation over industrial
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policy from the United States and other market economies. In a joint dispute filed in 2002 on US
safeguard measures against the importation of steel products, China and several other countries
found the U.S. actions to be inconsistent with its WTO obligations. Other than that, China dealt
with most of its disputes bilaterally prior to 2007, but has increased its utilization of the WTO
DSB. 156 There are several reasons why this might be.

China joined the World Trade Organization to gain the benefits of partaking in a
multilateral institution and seeks to change the rules of the system as much as it seeks to obey
them. 157 China’s NME status and the various terms of the Accession Protocol are a handicap in
many of the disputes. The WTO allows China to press for reform of anti-dumping rules and
protectionist policies within the established framework of the global liberal order. One way it can
do this is through initiating disputes. The course of behavior by member states influences the
evolution of the international norm regimes in the global liberal order. From trade and finance,
navigation, dispute resolution, arms control, migration, human rights, climate change and
environmentalism to more specialized issues like intellectual property rights, “regimes”
encompass the many facets of the international political system. 158 States are diverse and adopt a
variety of different strategies to fulfill their national objectives and appease domestic
constituencies. There is constant tension between states whose actions point to responsibly
abiding by the rules of the regime versus those whose strategy is not seen as consistent with
behavioral norms of the liberal status quo. The WTO DSB provides China with a voice within
the system to both defend itself and challenge other members.
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One year after joining the WTO Sun Zhenyu stated, “China will build the World Trade
Organization into an open, fair, transparent, and rational mechanism”. 159 China is pursuing
assertive, rather than aggressive, legalism. Aggressive legalism implies unjustified behavior
while assertive legalism acknowledges the established structure and is challenging the United
States based on the legality of its policies. China is challenging Western dominance in
international institutions, not the structure of the global liberal order. The disputes show China
has taken a “tit-for-tat” approach to solving its problems with the United States and EU by
identifying their hypocritical behavior. 160 China’s complaints are specifically targeting
discriminatory and dumping practices market economy countries are also guilty of
committing. 161 For instance, China formally requested WTO consultations in 2009 on the issue
of Chinese chicken sanitary restrictions in the U.S., which began in 2007. Using the language of
multilateralism, China stated that the U.S. violated national treatment clauses and certain
sections of WTO sanitary agreements. That same year, China launched anti-dumping
investigations into American firms exporting chicken parts unpopular in the U.S. market to
China, where they are considered delicacies. China argued this, in turn, adversely affects Chinese
poultry farmers and causes injury to its domestic industries. 162 China is using the structure of the
World Trade Organization to point out how the United States is guilty of the same practices its
accuses China of.

Disputes have risen as China has been gradually increasing its ability to utilize the WTO
framework. In addition to developing new domestic institutions to implement WTO standards,
China has pursued multiple avenues to learn about the World Trade Organization. Given the fact
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that the WTO is an entirely new experience to the Chinese, China has dedicated a number of
resources to adapting and learning the structure to utilize it to its interests. China has taken a
number of steps in the international and domestic realms. 163 The PRC established a Division of
WTO Law with access to in-house lawyers who have WTO legal experience to advise Chinese
strategy. China has also built consulting networks of professionals to build a foundation of
expertise. And, to manage disputes at the World Trade Organization, China instituted a WTO
Chapter in Geneva. 164 China’s investment in institutions geared towards learning about the
World Trade Organization points to a long-term interest in managing its relationship with the
global economic order. Increased litigation could be a result of “learning” about the WTO
structure and developing its capacity to file complaints against the U.S. and EU.

A third angle of the increased litigation issue is that China, like the United States, must
consider domestic constituencies when approaching its relationship with the World Trade
Organization. Conservative factions in China constantly question the extent to which Deng
Xiaoping’s reform strategy allows foreign countries to impact Chinese sovereignty. They remain
skeptical of the need for China to accept further obligations of the global liberal order by being a
member of a Western created, liberal institution like the World Trade Organization. When China
joined the WTO, Huang Yasheng argued that membership would bring about foreign
encroachment. 165 From critical domestic perspectives, China’s NME and aspects of the
Accession protocol like the TPSSM restrict China from receiving fair and equal treatment in the
Western oriented world and subject China’s national decision-making policies to foreign
interference. To be sure, these critics are justified in their claims, as the Chinese government has
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found the extent to which it can strategically intervene in trade policy limited by WTO
Agreements, the Accession Protocol, and the ability of trading partners to utilize the DSB against
China. As the increase in disputes in the post-2008 period shows, the leadership can initiate
disputes through the WTO DSB in response to scrutiny against China. Doing so helps appease
domestic concerns by demonstrating that China can achieve its national interests through the
WTO and is not completely at the mercy of Western exploitation when partaking in liberal
institutions.

Control over the relationship China has with the outside world is central to foreign
policy. Historically speaking, China has prioritized the protection of national sovereignty as its
primary foreign policy objective. 166 Another reason China is learning about the WTO is so that it
can legally defend the legitimacy of the Beijing Consensus in the international realm so it
maintains the role that the state plays in controlling the effects of globalization in China. This is
an essential part in appeasing domestic constituencies. The incident at Tiananmen Square in
1989 is a focal point for understanding the role of the state in China’s economic strategy in the
global liberal order.

A crucial element that informs China’s foreign policy is retaining control over internal
affairs. Social unrest at Tiananmen in 1989 threatened domestic stability, and riding the tide of
globalization reached a crossroads for the Chinese leadership. For the conservative faction within
the Party, the incident at Tiananmen Square represented the destabilizing effects of opening the
country to foreign influence and was an indicator that opening could lead China’s sovereignty to
be compromised by the outside world. China must maintain the role of the state in mediating the
effects of globalization to appease conservative factions within the Party, but more importantly
166
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to deal with the concerns of Chinese society as a whole. While an upsurge in liberal thinking had
some influence on the Tiananmen incident, the protests were deeply rooted in economic
problems. China’s adaptation to the global economy led to fluctuations in the domestic market
that contributed to the development of social disparity. Workers and peasants in China
experienced price inflation and protested the negative impact reforms had on individuals who did
not directly benefit from the reforms like Party elites and the business class. In the aftermath of
Tiananmen Square, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Western Financial Crisis in 2008
the importance of the Chinese government controlling the effects of global economic distortion
on its domestic population has been reinforced. To deal with these challenges, it is crucial that
the Chinese government continue to refine the Beijing Consensus to retain the legitimacy of its
economic model in the domestic realm while also remaining receptive to the international
community.

Chapter 3: China and the South China Sea

This chapter is about identifying and engaging the evidence for alternative interpretations
of China’s foreign policy based on developments in the South China Sea (SCS). Intensified
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conflict in the South China Sea raise questions about China’s militarization and multilateralism.
Observers with varying perspectives on the issue note developments in the South China Sea that
can be fit into two competing categories. The dominant outlooks on the nature of the
international political system frame the two categories. The first sees the world as being
characterized by great power competition. Here, the focus is on negative trends in the South
China Sea and aggressive Chinese behavior. The second downplays frictions’ likelihood to lead
to conflict, emphasizing the stability of the global liberal order’s institutional framework. In this
outlook, the focus is on understanding elements of Chinese foreign policy and strategic
environment. Both categories offer a vision of China’s future role in the international system and
shed light on the impact China will have on international norms.

China refuses international arbitration on the disputes in the South China Sea, citing
longstanding historical claims as a basis for its sovereignty over the South China Sea. However,
international law does not recognize China’s sovereignty over the SCS due to competing claims
by other states. Despite the unresolved nature of the SCS debate, China has been extensively
pursuing construction in disputed areas. At the same time, reports state that China apparently is
restricting other countries’ ships from the area. For the first school of thought, this information
suggests China is acting as noncompliant actor within the global liberal order undermining
multilateral dispute resolution. As a result of China’s suspected challenge to status quo norms,
questions have been raised about the strategic objective of China’s increasing power projection
capabilities in the South China Sea. In 2010, there were supposed reports that a Chinese official
made a remark about the South China Sea being a “core interest”, implying China will use
military force if necessary to enforce its interests over the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) member states’ competing claims. This is inherently contradictory to the
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liberal order constructed by the United States. In response to China’s allegedly irresponsible
behavior, Hilary Clinton expressed the United States’ interest in freedom of navigation and
willingness to intervene in the dispute. China responded by saying the dispute is not of
American concern and that the United States has no say in the South China Sea. Authors that
focus on China’s unilateral behavior have gone as far as describing China’s strategy in the SCS
as “a fundamental challenge to the international order the United States has tried to preserve
since the end of the Cold War”. 167 Observers who see the world as being conflict prone interpret
negative trends in China’s handling of the dispute to suggest the country’s ongoing military
modernization is offensively orientated. This segment of the literature emphasizes the potential
for military conflict to erupt in the international political system and believes China ultimately
seeks the military capabilities to defeat the United States and intimidate actors in the Asian
region.

On the other side of the debate, authors utilize a different approach for interpreting
China’s activity in the South China Sea. These observers deemphasize the confrontational
elements of China’s foreign policy, raising evidence of China’s positive integration into
multilateral structures and utilizing formal statements and documents from the PRC. They note
developing trends such as the diplomatic ties fostered by joint development and cooperation
through diplomatic forums that have strengthened the relationship between China and the
international community. Whereas peace and stability through the first perspective is
deteriorating as a result of China’s increasing presence on the sea, authors from this school of
thought put forth evidence to make the argument that disputes are being effectively managed and
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operate on a presumption that all countries seek to avoid conflict. Similar to the first perspective,
this school of thought looks at the world in a certain way. It deemphasizes alarm over events in
the South China Sea. Peace and stability is enduring and has actually historically progressed
despite claims of China’s confrontational behavior. China does not seek to provoke military
conflict with the United States or use its military to actively subdue its smaller neighbors. A less
malicious interpretation of China’s behavior leads these authors to believe the strategic intentions
of China’s militarization in the South China Sea are limited. These observers state that China’s
military modernization is defensive and cite China’s military integration into the multilateral
structure of the global liberal order.

Sorting supporting evidence from multiple authors into categories is one method for
analyzing concerns over China’s strategy. This chapter will look at China’s behavior in the South
China Sea from two angles to frame the debate around the character of China’s approach to
multilateralism and militarization. The chapter will introduce evidence from both schools of
thought derived from China’s action in the SCS to examine Chinese foreign policy. This method
also grounds conclusions based on China’s foreign policy approach and future impact on the
international political system by synthesizing the information and speculation provided by each
of the competing schools of thought. Doing so displays both positive and negative developments
in the South China Sea and helps weigh the arguments against each another.

The Importance of the South China Sea

The South China Sea is dotted with small islands, shoals, reefs, and sandbars. The
Spratly, Paracel, and Pratas island groupings and Scarborough Shoal are some of the major
features focused on in the debate, along with about 400 other minor features. Regional actors
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involved in the South China Sea dispute are China (People's Republic of
China), the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Singapore. Since the
1970’s all of these states have been involved in ongoing conflict over their competing postures
and actions in the South China Sea. 168 China’s increased activity in the South China Sea has
generated extensive and complicated disputes over the sovereignty of islands, their related
territorial waters, and derived exclusive economic zones (EEZ). A country legitimately seen as
having jurisdiction over the disputed islands and outcroppings is entitled to exploitation rights of
the resources in any given EEZ under prescription from UNCLOS.

The South China Sea is one of the most strategically and economically important bodies
of water in the world for three reasons: trade, natural resources, and fishing. 169 Sea-lanes in the
South China Sea are heavily used for conducting trade and are crucial to enduring economic
prosperity in the liberal order: 5.3 trillion dollars worth of goods passes through the SCS each
year. 170 Second, the South China Sea historically has served as fishing grounds to countries in
the surrounding area: with modern fishing technology, the sea yields more than 10 million fish
per year. 171 Most importantly, since countries began exploration of the area in the 1970’s, vast
reserves of oil and gas are believed to be contained in the seabed of the South China Sea: the US
Energy Administration speculates that there is 11 billion dollars worth of oil and 190 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas exist in the SCS.172 Rowan states that the region retains proven oil
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reserves of seven billion barrels and a production capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day. 173

Is China Undermining International Norms in the South China Sea?

China has defied arbitration in the South China Sea aimed at peacefully resolving the
conflict through the global liberal order’s dispute resolution mechanisms. 174 The Philippines and
Vietnam have both submitted evidence for their sovereignty claims to the Hague Tribunal this
past year, while China states that any ruling by the international court is illegitimate and that it
will not participate in the tribunal. 175 China refuses to “internationalize” the dispute, stating that
it holds sole sovereignty in the area and that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea has no jurisdiction over territorial claims. 176 A similar example of China’s refusal to
cooperate with international tribunals was seen in 2009 when Vietnam and Malaysia submitted a
joint complaint to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, arguing for their
sovereignty over the southern part of the South China Sea: China’s response was a picture of the
nine-dotted line line. 177 Contrary to integrating with multilateral institutional which contribute to
peace, the PRC insists any settlement on the South China Sea should be a bilateral rather than
through settlement by an international tribunal. China’s attitude is that its claim predates United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was agreed to in 1982 and came
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into force in 1994, and that it should be adjusted to accommodate historical rights. 178 The first
school of thought believes China’s unwillingness to compromise on the South China Sea issue
will lead it to aggressively assert its position in the area, undermining the framework of the
global liberal order. China’s defiance of multilateral dispute resolution raises concerns about its
commitment to the status quo of the liberal order. 179

Restricting Freedom of Navigation

China’s defiant attitude towards solving the South China Sea dispute through multilateral
dispute resolution is paired with evidence of provocative behavior. Various reports of Chinese
action serve as a platform for believing China ultimately seeks to challenge the framework of the
global liberal order in the South China Sea. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) is the core maritime agreement of the global liberal order. As Simon states,
international waters are “ostensibly governed by international law”, and agreements like
UNCLOS provides a framework for actors’ conduct in the South China Sea. 180 However,
Western media reports and citations from the scholarly literature suggest China has an interest in,
and is increasingly capable of, governing the South China Sea on its own terms even though it is
a member of UNCLOS.

The official stance of the Chinese government is enumerated in a letter sent to the UN
secretary general in 2010. The letter states that China is entitled to a “’Territorial Sea’ extending
22 kilometers from the baselines of the Spratly Islands and an EEZ out to 370 kilometers from
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these baselines”. 181 The claim is illustrated by the nine-dotted line line (NDL), which
encompasses 90% of the South China Sea. China has not backed down from the NDL claim
despite the interests of ASEAN states and United States concern over freedom of navigation,
enduring peace and stability, and multilateral conflict resolution. In doing so, China is
undermining several principles of the global liberal order.

The first example of China’s noncompliance with established principles of the global
liberal order has to do with freedom of navigation. There are multiple cases of China enacting
and/or enforcing policies that restrict the activities of other actors in the region. The People’s
Republic of China (PRC) imposed annual fishing bans from 2009-2012 in the waters
surrounding the Paracel Islands where other ASEAN states such as Vietnam also claim
sovereignty. 182 There is evidence that China is actively seeking to enforce unilateral fishing bans.
China has increased maritime patrols and has not been afraid of arresting fishermen from
countries like Vietnam with competing claims in the South China Sea. 183

China’s assertiveness is also seen in the conflict over oil and gas exploration in waters
surrounding the disputed islands but also in regions closer to the coasts of Vietnam and the
Philippines, although still within China’s NDL. A growing reliance on energy resources to fuel
economic growth has been used to explain China’s unilateral aggressiveness in this area of the
conflict, even though energy resources are critical to the interest of all countries involved in the
South China Sea region. Hong and Jiang note that “China’s thirst for oil is pushing its search and
its claims further and further offshore, and in the process it is both rubbing up against its
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neighbors and competing with them for the resources of the sea”. 184 In 2011, China expelled an
oil exploration vessel under contract with the Philippines’ government from the Reed Bank near
the Spratly islands. Later that same year, there were two incidents involving Chinese maritime
surveillance ships severing the seismic cables of Vietnamese ships operating in the Cam Ranh
Bay. Just a month later it happened again near the coast of Vietnam, which is especially alarming
given the fact that this occurred within what UNCLOS defines as Vietnam’s exclusive economic
zone. 185

Unilateral Action

Chinese assertiveness is not only cited in how the state restricts freedom of navigation of
other SCS actors, but also in is its unilateral construction in contested waters that exacerbates
tensions with other claimants. China occupies various features in the South China Sea, and in the
post-2008 period has been upgrading and expanding its regional deployments. China’s
infrastructural activity may be an indicator that the country seeks to build its power projection
capabilities in the region to back its claims. There are numerous examples of increased,
expansive activity by China in the SCS. China upgraded its facilities on Mischief Reef from
“fisherman structures” when first settled in 1995, to improved buildings with suspected militaryadministrative purposes. 186 Surveillance photos show similar activity by Beijing beyond the
Spratly Islands chain, and recent reports state that China has accelerated construction on about 6
disputed areas. For example, Chinese naval ships have been unloading concrete blocks on the
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Scarborough Shoal to supposedly build a landing strip for aircrafts. 187 In some cases, China is
using dredging vessels to create artificial landmasses, all with the assumed intent to create
barracks, airstrips, and radar sites. 188 China has constructed a naval base on the island of Hainan
capable of housing “submarine and surface combatants” including large frigates and destroyers
over 1000 nautical miles away from the Chinese mainland. 189 China further bolstered its
presence in the South China Sea by establishing local government bodies on Woody Island in
2009. 190 Another author notes that China’s unilateral assertion of its indisputable sovereignty
over the SCS and strategy of territorial expansion led China to put a billion dollar oil rig just 130
miles off the coast of Vietnam, challenging both competing claims of its five neighbors over the
NDL and U.S. efforts at rebalancing in the region. 191

Provoking Conflict

The evidence above suggests China is disregarding liberal order norms by restricting
freedom of navigation while pursuing its territorial claims within the nine-dotted line line. One
author notes that since 2008, China changed its general approach and is pushing more actively its
claims on natural resources, both living and nonliving, in the whole area enclosed by the ninedotted line. 192 In light of this, several commentators focus on China’s aggressive behavior when
enforcing its posture in the SCS and defending its claims. This focus in the debate reveals China
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may challenge status quo norms and threaten the relative peace and stability of the liberal order
by provoking conflict. A writer for CBS notes that while protecting its claims in the South China
Sea in 2013, Beijing rammed and sank a Vietnam fishing vessel in waters Vietnam and the
Philippines both claim sovereignty over. 193 Incidents between China and Indonesia also have
occurred. In June 2010, a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel pointed a large-caliber machine
gun at an Indonesian craft in the southern part of the South China Sea. 194 In 2011, a Chinese
warship instructed Philippine fishing boats to leave the eastern part of the South China Sea
immediately and to cease operating in Chinese territory. 195 This antagonistic behavior in all
regions of the South China exacerbates the chances of conflict between China and ASEAN
states.

China’s aggressive activity towards actors in the SCS is not limited to smaller ASEAN
states, but has also interfered with naval surveillance by the United States in Asia. The
Impeccable incident in March 2009 suggests China is willing to enforce its position in the South
China Sea even over American vessels operating in the region. Five Chinese ships surrounded
and harassed the US Navy vessel from waters near Hainan Island, claiming it to be in violation
of both Chinese domestic, and international, law. 196 Tim Keating, an admiral from the U.S
Pacific Command, interpreted the Impeccable incident as a “troubling indicator” that China is
not willing to “abide by the acceptable standards of behavior or rules of the world” in reference
to freedom of navigation. 197 Smaller incidents could ignite into military conflict between China
and its Southeast Asian neighbors and even the United States. In response to Chinese aggression
193

Pamela Falk, “Why China is pushing its neighbors’ buttons,” CBS News, November 11, 2014,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/changing-china-factors-behind-south-china-sea-territorial-dispute.
194
Song and Tønnesson, 254-55.
195
Ibid., 254.
196
Ibid., 252.
197
Raine, 71.

Farrell 76
in 2009, the US Senate passed a resolution that protested China’s “use of force” in the South
China Sea, sending a signal from Washington to China about its aggressiveness being at odds
with liberal order norms. 198

Chinese Militarization

Citations of Chinese unilateralism and nonconformity in the South China Sea give
substantial support for theoretical scenarios concerned with how the PRC’s military
modernization could negatively affect stability in the international political system. Hysteria
arises from commentators who see present day trends in Chinese foreign policy and interpret the
rise of China through Mearsheimer’s theory of international politics. 199 The keys to China’s
national security are power projection and a robust military to back assertions and the PRC’s
primary strategic consideration as it defends its claims in the South China Sea. Authors that
operate from this angle view China as a unitary actor maximizing its power and influence in an
uncertain world, highlight the growth in Chinese military and naval forces, and point to China's
growing reliance on offshore energy resources to fuel its modernization. This evidence
demonstrates that China’s rise will diverge from liberal order norms in the long run as it pursues
its interests.

China’s rise may cause friction with the liberal order through its military buildup, which
began with military modernization in 1979. Since then, the military capabilities of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) continue expanding. Specifically in the past decade, China has invested
heavily in modern military hardware and technology. Beginning in 1989, China’s military
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expenditures have averaged a growth rate of 12.1 percent per year. 200 In 2012, China’s defense
spending was the second largest in the world at $106 billion, although the United States’ budget
was much larger at $671 billion.201 This is only a minor detail when considering the military
capabilities of status quo actors dwarfed by China’s military might. China far outpaces all states
acting around the perimeter of the SCS in defense spending: Japan, 51 billion; India, 35 billion;
South Korea 24 billion; Vietnam, 2.4 billion—not to mention the other ASEAN states that have
just begun militarizing in response to China’s overwhelming advantage. Furthermore, there is a
consensus stating China deflates its reports on defense spending and hides additional funds for
military expenditures in other areas of its budget. 202 These observations become even more
alarming when accounting for the fact that US dollars buy more in China than they do in
America. A calculation using purchasing power parity (PPP) illustrates that the reported $106
billion spent in China looks more like $400 billion. 203 This is an alarming amount of spending to
status quo actors suspicious of what China intends to use its military and naval forces for.

How does China’s interest in having a large military to justify its assertive actions relate
to the SCS? China may use its military capabilities to defend claims. An interest in large military
forces implies that China may act aggressively and use force to defend its strategic interests. 204
This would disrupt peace and stability in the Asian region. A perceived uncertainty of China’s
military intentions creates hysteria over how it plans to use its military power in the long run. Is
it a benign or threatening process? Is it limited or expansive? According to the Pentagon, the
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PRC has not made its goals clear and lacks adequate military transparency and a well-defined
explanation to the international community of militarization’s strategic purpose. 205

The United States asserts that a lack of clarity in China’s foreign policy goals represents
a challenge to the global liberal order. An offensive-minded and expansive Chinese military
doctrine, which seeks to establish a Sino-centric world order, is inherently at odds with American
hegemony and the global liberal order it constructed. The US Department of Defense best
articulates alarm over the nature of China’s militarization conforming to Mearsheimer’s
understanding of global politics. 206 The United States claims that the Chinese government has
not explained “why they are moving so quickly”, “why they need such strong forces”, and “how
they plan to use these forces”. 207 Not only is uncertainty a problem for status quo liberal order
actors in China’s periphery, but also a crucial concern for the United States. Negative trends in
the South China Sea debate since 2008 lead authors to ascribe China’s territorial expansion and
restrictions on multilateralism as evidence of a maritime threat. 208 China’s naval forces may be
developing with the sole aim of threatening U.S. security and interests. Mearsheimer argues that
in its bid for regional hegemony, China will have no other way to secure its interests unless it
displaces US global leadership. 209 Admiral Robert F. Willard thinks China’s military
development appears designed to challenge America’s freedom of action in the Asian region or
coerce its neighbors, including U.S. treaty and alliance partners. 210 China’s increasing
capabilities could lead it to confront the American hegemon.
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Chinese naval modernization shows signs of challenging the United States’ posture in
Asia. Since the 1990s, China continues to pursue a strategy known as “anti-access/area-denial”
(a2 /ad). As a result, China has significantly improved its air and sea capabilities. The Chinese
arsenal includes anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles,
surface-to-air missiles, submarines, destroyers, patrol crafts, and amphibious ships. 211 With this
equipment, China can target every air base and port in the Western Pacific, and acquire the
ability to sink foreign vessels, from ASEAN ships to U.S. aircraft carriers operating hundreds of
miles off its coasts. The People’s Liberation Army has also been experimenting with cyber
warfare, antisatellite weapons and began expanding its small force of intercontinental nuclear
missiles. Another one of China’s current projects is developing EMP technology that can disable
enemy military systems and hardware operating in the region. 212 When interpreting this
evidence, it seems China is building its own high tech network to “leapfrog” current American
capabilities, as the PRC moves to cement regional hegemony. 213

The extent of China’s militarization is paired with evidence that the country is
consistently undermining liberal order norms. The first category creates a picture of a world
heading towards conflict and revision. Authors that subscribe to this perspective view China’s
defiant attitude towards international arbitration, aimed at peacefully resolving the dispute, as a
sign that China has an interest in altering the current structure of the global liberal order. China
will do so in a confrontational manner using military power to push its assertions and plans on
overthrowing the status quo and usurping American hegemonic dominance.
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Understanding China’s Military Modernization

Authors who emphasize negative trends in relations between China and the international
community are countered by contrasting news reports and opinions within the scholarly
literature. In an article for Foreign Policy, Andy Hu instructs his readers to forget all the “gloom
and doom”. Hu notes positive developments in 2014 between China and the international
community: “China participated for the first time in this year’s U.S.-hosted Rim of the Pacific
Drills, the largest international maritime exercise”. 214 China’s cooperation with the international
community suggests that military modernization could contribute to status quo peace and
stability. Another shortcoming of the fist school of thought is that it overlooks the importance of
economic relationships between the countries involved in the dispute. despite suspected souring
relations between China and its neighbors over disputes in the South China Sea (and East China
Sea), all 21 APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) members endorsed the Free Trade Area
of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) arrangement over the United States Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) proposal, which excluded China. 215 Long-term economic cooperation between actors
provide a foundation towards peaceful resolution of the conflict. Taken together, these two
points suggest that China’s relationship with the international community is progressing
positively despite citations of concern noted above. Relations with both regional neighbors and
the United States seem to be proceeding in a relatively stable fashion. The chapter will now turn
towards providing relevant counterpoints to arguments concerned with the nature of China’s
militarization and China’s unilateralism in the South China Sea and in the international
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community. The scholarly literature that deemphasizes fears in the South China Sea points to
disputes having a minimal effect on regional cooperation and even argues that peace and stability
have increased. 216

The first category states that China’s military policy is ambiguous and essentially
contributes to why peace in the South China Sea is deteriorating. However, the aforementioned
school of thought fails to acknowledge positive trends in Chinese policy. In his analysis of
Chinese military strategy, Taylor Fravel notes that sources on China’s military doctrine and
strategies used to train PLA officers over the past decade have become more available. 217
Analyzing the historic trend of China’s militarization, its purpose, and positive aspects of PLA
behavior in the present day reveal how China’s military modernization shows that its objectives
for the use of military power are more certain than many policy analysts maintain. 218

Since beginning its military reforms, China has been influenced by global trends it
perceived within the international community, as the PRC became a more active global
participant in the post-Mao era. Under Mao’s autarkic system, China’s military had limited
capacity beyond its borders. Yet, after a confrontation with Vietnam in 1979, China became
aware that its military and naval forces needed to be significantly upgraded. This event led China
to begin expanding its military budget beyond ground capabilities. As a result, China has
developed the capabilities to conduct military and naval operations crucial to backing its security
objectives: regime security, territorial integrity, national unification, maritime security, and
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regional stability. 219 China’s militarization has strategic, limited purposes that the school of
thought prone to push “all-out war” scenarios seems to overlook.

China’s increased emphasis on modernizing its military in the 1990’s can be explained by
its perception of American military power. In 1991, the U.S deployed military troops in the
Persian Gulf War that far outmatched China’s capabilities, emphasizing the global role of the
U.S military. 220 China’s reaction to American superiority is reflected in its updated military
strategy in 1993, when the Chinese leaders revised the PLA’s military strategy to be capable of
fighting “local wars under modern high technology conditions” 221. The Taiwan Strait Crisis in
1995-1996 further emphasized this point when the United States sent aircrafts to support Taiwan
after China set off missiles in the Strait. The United States threatened intervention exacerbated
Chinese insecurity over the fact that the U.S could deploy advanced military technology in
support of Taiwan. China has labeled Taiwan a core interest that it is not afraid to use military
force over. However, the PRC’s position is meaningless if the United States can overpower
China if the U.S. chooses to intervene. Part of the reason China is increasing its military power is
to act as a deterrent of American interference in issues seen as integral to Chinese sovereignty. 222

In regards to seeking global leadership or seeking to usurp the United States’ role as
global hegemon, Chinese officials have made statements that stand at odds with Western
arguments about its militarization meaning it seeks global leadership. In a 2010 interview for the
Wall Street Journal, State Councilor Dai Bingguo told the U.S. audience that ‘‘China has never
thought of vying for leading position in the world,’’ that China has cooperated with the United
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States over various trouble spots, and is a ‘‘partner the United States can count on”. 223 He stated
that China was not seeking ‘‘hegemony,’’ that it did not want to ‘‘eject the U.S. from Asia,’’ and
that the South China Sea would be resolved by future generations. 224 Unlike the United States,
China does not display the same caliber or power-projection capabilities of a global military.
China still has a long way to go in developing the capacities of a modern military. PLA buildup
doesn’t imply a rejection of cooperation with United States, but only a desire to level the playing
field. Two of China’s core purposes for military power are maritime security and regional
stability. Increased naval patrols and activity in the South China Sea display China taking a
proactive role in maintain its security objectives in the region. 225

Part of China’s reason for modernizing stems from a disadvantage in protecting Chinese
sovereignty in worst-case scenarios. The U.S. maintains ties with China’s neighbors and regional
competitors, many whom have competing territorial claims with China. The primary issue is
Taiwan, whom the U.S. agreed to sell arms to in 2010, despite Beijing’s core interest in national
unification and sensitivity on the issue. In addition, the United States retains a dominant regional
presence. Washington has enhanced both its military and naval postures in East Asia in the 21st
century. 60 percent of U.S submarines are deployed in Asia. 226 In 2006, the U.S government
signaled its intention to keep more U.S naval forces in the Pacific than the Atlantic. 227 The
United States has moved attack submarines, B-2 bombers, surveillance drones, and ammunition
stockpiles to an American military outpost in Guam. It also upgraded relations with South Korea,
one of China’s immediate neighbors. During the Bush Administration, the U.S withdrew 40% of
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its troops from South Korea and reduced military exercises between the two countries. This
trend has been reversed in light of the Obama administration’s Pivot to East Asia announced in
2010, which aims to amplify U.S defense ties with countries throughout the region and increase
U.S. naval presence. 228 The U.S and South Korea reached new defense agreements and upgraded
American military facilities on the Korean Peninsula. The United States has moved more troops
to South Korea and the two countries conduct joint naval exercises with increasing frequency.

In the post-2008 setting, the United States has also increased cooperation with many
other actors in China’s “backyard”. The U.S. expanded its joint naval exercises with Japan,
conducted naval exercises with Vietnam for the first time since the Vietnam War, and signed an
agreement on defense cooperation with Vietnam in 2011. The United States sells arms to the
Philippines and in 2014 made plans to further finance its military modernization. 229 In addition,
the United States strengthened ties with Cambodia, and restored defense cooperation with
Indonesia and New Zealand, while stationing marines in Australia. Even with budget cuts in
2011 and 2012, the U.S. government has emphasized its strength in Asia. 230

As China’s rise prompts its growing activity, the Chinese strategy is framed by a strong
U.S presence in the region. Meanwhile, the United States and its developed allies maintain an
arms and defense technology embargo that has been in place since 1989. In justifying its
defensive military buildup, the Chinese perspective asserts that Washington’s activity in Asia is
aimed at containing China’s rise. It seems the threat China poses to the U.S is an indirect and
limited one based on being able to defend China’s regional security objectives despite the
228
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dominant capabilities of the United States. The extension of Chinese military operations into the
South China Sea is a result of its developing maritime capacities and indicates a defensive
strategy.

Framing the Debate That Surrounds the South China Sea

China’s noncompliance with freedom of navigation norms and its expansion in the South
China Sea raises concern about whether China seeks to unilaterally enforce its “territorial sea”
and claim all resources in the region. Yet, in 2012 the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that “no
country, including China, has claimed sovereignty over the entire South China Sea”. 231 Why
then, would China’s actions in the South China Sea look to be acting assertively and confronting
foreign vessels? Part of the reason is that often times the media reports on the issue selectively.
China is not the only state to conduct surveillance and arrests: ASEAN members also get
involved in the conflict. Indonesian patrol boats seized two Vietnamese vessels in February
2012. Furthermore, Chinese vessels have also been harassed in the South China Sea. In 2009
Indonesia claimed it caught more than 180 foreign vessels for illegal fishing in their waters. This
includes 75 Chinese fishermen arrested by Indonesia in June.232 China’s increased maritime
surveillance in the South China Sea is also aimed at protecting its vessels from foreign
harassment.

China has been expanding its activities in the South China Sea since it first occupied the
Paracel islands in 1976 when it clashed with Vietnam. However, China is not the only actor that
occupies features in the South China Sea despite the unsettled nature of the dispute. 233 For
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example, Vietnam maintains armed garrisons and military troops on about 22 geographic
locations throughout the South China Sea and has also undertaken significant construction
activity, building airstrips on a variety of features to assert its claims. 234 In addition, all claimants
occupy some part of the Spratly Islands. Unlike China, some claimants already have airfield
capabilities on the Spratly islands: Vietnam on Southwest Cay; Taiwan on Taiping island; the
Philippines on Pagasa island; and Malaysia on Swallow Reef. 235 Given this information, China’s
infrastructural expansion, including its Scarborough Shoal activities, in the South China Sea
looks like a natural response to its strategic environment and the actions of other claimants in the
South China Sea.

One shortcoming of authors who fear China’s militarization being aimed at unilaterally
securing its energy needs in the SCS is that they fail to acknowledge energy security is not a
zero-sum game. China may be pursuing energy claims in the South China Sea, but this does not
mean other countries cannot do so too. Hong and Jiang note that multiple countries are involved
in joint ventures with oil companies and also maintain energy expeditions in the SCS. Malaysia
has gas fields off the coast of Sarawak; the Philippines operate within the Camago and
Malampaya fields; Indonesia has the Natuna gas field and a pipeline to Singapore; along with
Vietnamese Lan Tay and Lan Do gas fields that are being operated by BP in a joint venture with
an Indian oil company and PetroVietnam. 236 And, despite its protest of other countries pursuing
natural resource exploration with Western oil companies, China has even shown a willingness to
address energy security in a multilateral context. Oil corporations from China, the Philippines,
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and Vietnam signed a joint agreement on marine seismic research in the SCS in 2005. 237
Although the agreement was reported to have lapsed in 2008, its proposal points to the potential
for joint development between the regional actors to effectively manage the security objectives
crucial to their long-term interests in the SCS. Much of the fear from the first school of thought
interprets China’s energy-related activities in the South China Sea as a sign that it seeks to assert
its unilateral control. Instead, the second school of thought states that China’s activities are a
result of both its capabilities on the international stage and its need to develop energy security
increasing simultaneously. Even though the Western media mostly focus on China’s
development in the SCS, several regional actors steadily maintain energy projects in the area
despite the ongoing nature of the dispute.

Multilateralism Downplays Conflict in the South China Sea

The second side of the debate deemphasizes citations of China’s questionable behavior in
the South China Sea, operating from a stance that sees the Chinese grand strategy still
conforming to Deng’s policy advice of avoiding conflict and pursuing joint development. 238
Michael Weissmann argues that relative peace and stability in the region has actually
increased. 239 This perspective concludes that fears over conflict in the South China Sea
stemming from China’s actions are overstated and need proper contextualization. 240 While some
of China’s actions may contribute to friction, the importance is that conflicts are being actively
managed and have not erupted into military conflict. As a result of the positive trend in China’s
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activeness and its use of diplomacy rather than military coercion, conflict in the South China Sea
appears capable of being managed through cooperation. 241

In 2010, Marvin Ott made three points about the geopolitics of the South China Sea.
First, China’s claims and those of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei have been
downplayed as the countries all have put an overwhelming preference on economic growth.
Second, China’s treatment of Vietnam is the exception to the first point. Third, some of China’s
actions, like the harassment of the U.S Impeccable, are “disturbing”. 242 Utilizing Ott’s
observation of developments in the South China, the chapter will assess China’s behavior on the
international stage from a second school of thought.

Economic Interdependence and Regional Diplomacy

Ott’s first point is that despite the reports of worsening relations in the South China Sea,
economic rationale still forms the foundation for thinking about conflict destabilizing relations
between claimants. Several authors note aspects of China’s relationship with other claimants that
support Ott’s first point. Since the turn of the century, China’s has adapted a proactive outlook
on participating in multilateral forums with countries involved in the South China Sea. This has
served as a foundation for preventing conflict over dispute in the SCS.243 Through an active
approach to regional cooperation beginning in the 1990’s, China has alleviated the fears of its
neighbors, allowing economic ties to grow as a buffer to conflict. Today, China is ASEAN’s
largest trading partner. The SCS conflict cannot be separated from the overarching Sino-ASEAN
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relations. The second way of looking at the international political system emphasizes the historic
progression of crisis management and diplomatic cooperation between actors in the South China
Sea. In a relatively short period, China moved from passivity and suspicion to proactive
engagement in regional regimes and institutions. 244 Through this lens, economic
interdependence and the embrace of multilateral cooperation between ASEAN states and China
over the dispute have deescalated the chances of conflict in the South China Sea. There is a
framework towards settling the dispute in the long run and preserving the status quo.

Elite interactions and Sino-ASEAN/East Asian regionalization developed out of the web
of diplomatic venues that have helped to mitigate tensions in the South China Sea. The
“Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea” workshops, hosted by Indonesia in the
early 1990’s, served as a platform for China to assess its relationship in diplomatic venues with
other claimants in the South China Sea. China’s experience with the workshops led the country
to dramatically reexamine its view of multilateral institutions and served as a stepping stone
towards negotiation between the claimants by promoting cooperation, confidence building, and
trust among conflicting parties. 245 As Song and Tønneson state in an article that evaluates the
severity of conflict in the SCS, “the balance has shifted over time toward a stronger regional
emphasis on conflict management manifested in the 2002 China-ASEAN Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties, which rejected the use of force to resolve disputes in the South China Sea. 246
China has also begun to emphasize coordinating regional security efforts. In the 2003 ARF InterSessional Group and ARF foreign ministers’ meetings, China startled other members by
introducing a concept paper that included a wide-ranging set of proposals for increasing regional
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military exchanges and establishing an annual security policy conference. 247 At the same
summit, ASEAN and China signed the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity, which addresses a wide range of political, social, economic, and security issues. And,
in 2003, China formally acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which formally
commits China to enforcing the principles of nonaggression and noninterference. Although the
treaty dedicates countries to upholding these two principles, many of the signatories, not just
China, are guilty of interfering in the affairs of other actors in the SCS. However, when incidents
occur, they appear to be minor and have been managed by the governments of the states
involved. Furthermore, tensions in the South China Sea have not become overtly aggressive or
disrupted status quo stability. While conflict persists in the post-2008 era, it is being managed
through economic interdependence and diplomatic venues to promote the maintenance of normal
relations.

Defusing Tension in the Sino-Vietnamese Relationship

Ott also points out that Sino-Vietnamese relations in the South China Sea remain
antagonistic, but another crucial aspect of the South China Sea debate is the historic deescalation of conflict between all actors: including China and Vietnam. Recall China’s cable
cutting conflict with Vietnam over gas and oil exploration. The pessimistic school of thought
would interpret this as evidence that China is provoking conflict, even though China has
protested. Yet, Chinese and Vietnamese officials in October 2011 signed a six-point agreement
in response to the cable cutting, taking a step towards solving their maritime disputes “on the
basis of legislation and principles enshrined in international law, including the United Nations
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Convention on the Law of the Sea signed in 1982”. 248 And, even though China insists that it
stands firm on its maritime claims, the PRC withdrew the oil rig it had placed near the
Vietnamese coast when its development in contested waters was ill-received. 249 Historically
speaking, tensions in the South China Sea have decreased, and war has become less likely as a
result of China’s acceptance of multilateralism and the institutionalization of regional
relationships has led to conflict management. 250 This is a significant achievement given the fact
that violent conflict has been quick to erupt in the past. In 1974, China and Vietnam clashed in
military conflict over the Paracel Islands that left over 50 dead when Vietnamese artillery ships
fired at Chinese fishing boats and caused retaliation by the PRC. 251 The two countries clashed
again in 1988 over the Spratly Islands in an incident that left over 70 Vietnamese dead. 252

Although persisting present day frictions show how historical tensions over the South
China Sea run deep in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, the two countries have put an increased
emphasis on working together to create a basis for conflict prevention since normalizing
diplomatic relations in 1991. Elite interactions between China and Vietnam have increased. Party
leaders meet once a year to coordinate bilateral exchanges, and military officials also exchange
visits. Vietnam’s economic ties with China have also dramatically increased, deemphasizing the
likelihood of conflict since bilateral relations began to develop. China has heavily invested in a
number of joint ventures with Vietnam, and a recent report from the Vietnam News states that
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China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner. 253 Furthermore, Vietnam is a member of the ChinaASEAN Free Trade Agreement that went into effect in 2010 and also part of APEC, which
extended the regional FTA in 2014. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area is a primary example of
how the SCS dispute is one of the many aspects of foreign policy that the countries involved
need to consider when approaching overarching relations in the region.

Sino-U.S. Cooperation and China’s Military Diplomacy

While Ott states that five Chinese vessels’ interference with naval surveillance routines
by the USNS Impeccable is “disturbing”, Strategic and Defense Studies specialist Brendan
Taylor reports that good sense prevailed between China and the United States. Senior officials
from both countries stated that “such incidents would not become the norm and pledged deeper
cooperation to ensure so”. 254 Successful resolution suggests that there has been cooperation over
incidents in recent years that could potentially reduce conflict. The resolution of the Impeccable
incident stands at odds with Denny Roy’s claim that U.S-China military relations are in poor
condition. 255 In addition, conflict management undermines the first school of thought’s argument
that believes China and the United States are heading towards future conflict. Through the
perspective of the second school of thought, China’s non-confrontational military modernization
finds evidence in instances of successful cooperation over minor incidents, Considering how
China held U.S air personnel captive for a week in 2001 when extracting an apology from the
U.S government over a collision that left a Chinese pilot dead, relations seem to be progressing
in a positive direction that will help maintain peace and stability.
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In addition to noting how China’s activities in the South China Sea are being managed,
the second perspective also cites how Chinese military and naval forces are contributing to
regional and international security, rather than threatening stability. Despite the modernization
needs of the Chinese military to defend both its traditional and nontraditional interests, defense
spending has also been allocated towards supporting multilateral security. In recent years, China
emphasizes the importance of its military diplomacy, increasing bilateral and multilateral
cooperation with other countries. China conducts a wide range of military exchanges with over
150 nations, ranging from high level dialogues and personnel training to coordinating on
nontraditional global security issues like disaster relief. After refusing to participate in joint
exercises with foreign militaries and navies for many years, China began to participate in the
Gulf of Aden counter piracy operations in 2008. Another aspect of China’s military
modernization contributing to global security is its participation in United Nations’ Peacekeeping
Operations. Of all the permanent members on the U.N. Security Council, including the United
States, China is the largest contributor towards global peacekeeping efforts. 256 The integration of
Chinese military forces into the structure of the international political system serves as a way of
binding China to the international political system. This perspective shows China’s military
actively participating in security objectives beyond its sovereign territory and regional seas
enhancing, not detracting from, peace and stability. Conflict between China and the United
States or other members of the international community seems far off when focusing on a
broader picture of China’s military strategy.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion

The spoiler, supporter, and shirker scenarios identify key possibilities concerning the
nature of China’s relationship with the international system. Changing power capabilities, the
institutional structure of the international political system, and a state’s national interest frame
the debate on China’s present day behavior. As David Shambaugh suggests,

China’s growing economic and military power, expanding political influence, distinctive
diplomatic voice, and increasing involvement in regional multilateral institutions are key
developments in Asian affairs. China’s new proactive regional posture is reflected in
virtually all policy spheres— economic, diplomatic, and military—and this parallels
China’s increased activism on the global stage. 257
The arguments that the three scenarios offer are important to consider when assessing China’s
future impact on the world, but it is crucial to outline the assumptions and shortcomings of each
scenario before analyzing China’s behavior in the World Trade Organization and South China
Sea. The spoiler scenario is built upon a foundation that focuses on states’ divergent interests and
security challenges in the global system. Yet, it does not acknowledge the institutionalization of
economic relations between states in the historic evolution of the international political system.
The supporter scenario is built upon the foundation of a highly interconnected global order and
bases its claims of Chinese conformity on China’s economic integration. However, it glazes over
the frictions between China and the international community, and assumes China will inevitably
become the Western model of a responsible stakeholder. The shirker scenario focuses on China’s
economic integration and the ways Chinese policy is guided by domestic interests. This scenario
cites evidence to explain China’s reluctance to play an active part in the global governance
structure. However, it does not do a sufficient job engaging China’s proactivity on the
international stage.
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After conducting case studies on China’s activity in the World Trade Organization and in
the South China Sea, I conclude that China is willing to accept international norms compatible
with its interests, but it also seeks to use its capabilities as a rising power to modify international
norms so that they take into account Chinese interests. The rise of China will manifest itself in a
way that is most consistent with the supporter scenario. China favors a strategy of integration
into the existing international political system while revising aspects of the global liberal order
that do not adequately reflect the divergent nature of its goals from Western interests. Even when
aspects of China’s behavior point towards revisionism, its foreign policy approach is still
working within the framework of multilateralism. That being said, China’s overall multilateral
diplomacy cannot be categorized as fundamentally status quo or revisionist in nature. This
framework does not take into account the character of Chinese assertiveness. It is important to
note that China’s growing assertiveness on the international stage is contained by the multilateral
structure of the international political system. In an article on China’s diverse multilateralism,
Wuthnow, Qi, and Li outline four basic behaviors that can be applied to its economic and
security strategy on the international stage. They describe how China’s activity materializes
through “watching, which is a passive, status quo-oriented posture; engaging, which is an
assertive, but still status quo-oriented posture; circumventing, which is revisionist, but relatively
unassertive; and shaping, which is both revisionist and assertive in nature”. 258 In the World
Trade Organization, China has moved beyond watching and in recent years taken a more active
approach towards utilizing the WTO DSB. China is engaging in some ways and shaping in
others. It has even circumvented Western institutions in the international economic system and
played a lead role in developing multilateral infrastructure, much like the United States did in the
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post-World War II era. In the South China Sea, China’s strategy reveals elements of engaging,
circumventing, and shaping. Even when seeking to revise norms of the global liberal order,
China has done this in a relatively non-confrontational way. China’s behavior will remain status
quo oriented to maintain the economic benefits of its relationships, adapting to norms while
taking a more assertive stance on issues central to its domestic policy. China’s behavior in the
WTO and SCS both suggest status quo oriented behavior. Concerning the WTO, China is
working within the multilateral structure of the international trading system to advance its own
strategy while accepting norms it sees as compatible with its interests. China’s economic model
distinctly maintains the role of the state in economic policy while accepting the dominant
principles of Western capitalism. While China defends the Beijing Consensus despite pressure
from the United States, it has actively implemented WTO DSB resolutions and shown an active
approach in developing its domestic institutions and international standards to address issues
such as intellectual property theft. In other ways, China’s integration into the status quo reflects
the reality of the international political system. Like other WTO members, China has been found
guilty of enacting protectionist policies that contradict the obligations of membership in the
organization. In the South China Sea, China has pursued energy development and increased its
activities in the region despite the unresolved nature of the dispute.

The case studies on China’s actions in the World Trade Organization and South China
Sea reveal that China’s integration into the multilateral structure of the international political
system has come a long way since Mao’s autarkic era. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms have
influenced China to play a more active role in the international community, and doing so has led
the country to adapt to international economic and security norms as it will continue to do in the
future. However, China’s sovereignty is still at the core of its foreign policy approach. While
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China’s rise is contained by the institutionalized structured of the global liberal order, its
growing influence as a great power allows it to defend its national interest on the international
stage when pressured by aspects of the Western-oriented global liberal order. China is a status
quo actor in regards to maintaining peace and stability within the international political system,
but it will influence the global liberal order to evolve into a system that reflects the divergent
national interests of its participants. This will not be a confrontational process but will take place
within the multilateral and diplomatic structure of the international political system. In the era of
China’s rise, there is an emphasis on norms of conflict management and maintaining
international stability crucial to the domestic interest of all actors involved. While the United
States and its allies constructed the global liberal order, China’s evolution allows the country to
play a major role in challenging aspects of the international political system that privilege
Western practices. Integrative aspects of China’s foreign policy within the status quo suggest that
the outcome offered by the spoiler scenario is unlikely to manifest itself. Furthermore, China’s
conformity to the emphasis on conflict resolution and its willingness to participate in the
multilateral framework of the international political system indicates that the country’s rise will
be most consistent with the supporter scenario. Still, China will defend its national interests
through acceptable standards and “shirk” aspects of the global liberal order that are geared
towards Western or American interests. By offering research that considers China’s increased
participation in the system along with the challenges that exist in its relationship with the global
liberal order, I take a stance similar to Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur in their argument of
China’s future role in the system. This scenario is characterized by a “third way of continued
internalization by China of select global practices and norms, alongside registering its desire and
right to be at the table for rewriting some”. 259 Globalization, economic interdependence, and the
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explicit intention of countries to avoid conflict have changed the nature of great power
relationships. 260 Conflict management, enduring stability, and the development of a multipolar
world characterize the future elements of the international political system.

Analysis of China and the World Trade Organization

In the words of China’s 2008 national defense white paper, “the future and destiny of
China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community. China cannot
develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability
without China”. 261 Chinese officials understand that China is dealing with an institutionalized
order that cannot be ignored. Its integration into the global economy has created a degree of
dependency on the international community. Economic thinking by both China and the United
States forms the underlying reason why each country has a core interest in maintaining favorable
conditions in the international environment. Ikenberry states that “Chinese economic interests
would seem to be most congruent with the existing international order. The global capitalist
system is open and loosely institutionalized—and it is a system in which China is currently
thriving”. 262 Unlike the Soviet Union, China’s economy is heavily intertwined with the actors of
the global liberal order. In addition, WTO rules bar the American government from enacting
trade sanctions against China to settle economic (and sometimes noneconomic) disputes on its
own terms. 263 In the future, membership in the WTO will be pivotal to China’s economic
relationship with the international community. WTO rules and institutions offer legal and
political protection against future economic discrimination, as the Chinese economy grows and
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develops its capabilities to advance its claims in the WTO. 264 Even if the WTO dispute
settlement body allows the U.S. and the EU to criticize the Beijing Consensus, when China
receives full market economy status from the WTO in 2016. the Beijing Consensus will be
validated as legitimate economic strategy, despite its divergence from Western norms.

China’s strategy may cause friction between actors in the global economy, but on the
whole it seems to be in line with supporting the structure of a globalized economic system. When
challenging norms on economic strategy within the global liberal order, China has done so
within the established framework of the international political system so as to not disrupt status
quo stability. With regard to its growing presence in multilateral negotiation mechanisms, China
embodies the divergent interests of many countries from those traditional great powers within the
system. China – unlike the United States or members of the EU – is a developing country, a nonWestern culture, a non-democracy, a victim of colonialism, and a country opposed to
intervention in other states’ internal affairs. 265 It is worth noting that when China pushed for
WTO recognition of its market economy status, the country gained accelerated support from
friendly states such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela. 266 Given the distinctive
character of the Beijing Consensus, China’s membership in the World Trade Organization
provides an outlet for multilateral negotiation in regards to economic policies acceptable in the
global trading system beyond the criteria of the Washington Consensus. China’s economic
policy of market socialism has provided an attractive model for other developing countries that
fear accepting outright capitalism will expose their populace to the pressure of market forces. 267
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The disputes between China and the international community are historically persistent
issues resulting from the growth of the overall beneficial economic relationships China has
established with its trading partners. Now, these disputes are being funneled into an institution
dedicated to resolving trade tensions in the global economic system. China appears to be actively
implementing DSB rulings while advancing its own complaints utilizing the DSB against the
discriminatory policies it often faces. Since China’s reform era began, it has made a variety of
concessions to U.S. interests so it could gain the benefits of participating in the global economy,
but there is still a continuation of trade frictions targeting China’s willingness to liberalize.
Bringing disputes to the WTO illustrates a mechanism for the U.S. to engage China on issues it
sees as crucial to its interests, like forcing the Chinese economy to liberalize as much as possible
before 2016. For example, while China has made drastic reforms in its system, it has not
completely accepted the terms of its Accession Protocol. The European Union Press Release
Database notes that “China committed itself to refrain from imposing export duties except for 84
specific tariff lines…it still applies export duties on 346 tariff lines, as well as export quota and
licensing regimes on many products”. 268 Rulings in the raw materials and rare earth disputes
draw attention to obligations China has not fully signed on to and sets a precedent for future
cases brought against China concerning trade barriers. Regardless of its status in the WTO,
China is largely still a developing country that may not be able to live up to the standard in
international trade. 269 While China continues to build its domestic capabilities to meet the
standards of its WTO Accession, the Western Financial Crisis has created an international
environment where the United States and its trading partners will be especially critical of state
intervention that affects their industries. China’s hybrid economy plays a critical role in the
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disputes and could pose a challenge to WTO jurisprudence in the long run when delivering
rulings. 270 As a result of the complexity of the issue, increased litigation may threaten to
overload the WTO with cases and in turn undermine its ability to issue rulings that China must
abide by, but this remains to be seen. China has played a proactive role in settling many of the
disputes without waiting for the DSB to. Of the 31 disputes that have been filed against China,
23 have been settled. In 11 of the 23 disputes, China handled complaints bilaterally before the
DSB needed to investigate the issue, making the changes necessary to satisfy its trading
partners. 271 China’s pattern of bilaterally handling disputes in some instances while
implementing DSB findings in others shows that the Chinese government is receptive to the
complaints filed against it. In the future, it is likely that China will continue to adapt to
international standards when frictions arise in its economic relationships.

Even though the state has historically played a pivotal role in the Chinese economy, and
the economies of Japan and South Korea also retain distinctive characteristics when compared to
Western economies, the United States consistently challenges the structure of the China’s
economy while turning a blind eye to other Asian countries. 272 Despite the divergent strategies of
other Asian economies and historical diminution of the role of the Chinese state in its economy
as it has integrated into global capitalist trading structures, the United States remains highly
critical of China’s strategy. There are three reasons why this problem persists. First, the United
States took the lead in establishing liberal institutions and creating the order China is integrating
within. As a result, the U.S will criticize practices it believes are inconsistent with the global
norms that it has established. Second, the United States has run a trade deficit increasing year by
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year since 1971, while China’s manufacturing and export industry have steadily grown. Third,
the United States’ trade imbalance with China became the U.S.’s largest bilateral trade deficit in
2000. Concentrating its trading deficit on China created a fat political target for American
domestic constituencies to vent their frustrations on. 273

The divergent nature of the Beijing Consensus and the fact that China is found guilty in
many of the disputes filed against it could raise the possibility of a challenge to the liberal norm
of markets free from state intervention, but in the post-2008 era even the American government
has taken a more active role in the economy. As Chapter 2 reveals, the United States
administration also manipulates global market access when imposing green barriers on Chinese
products and enacting discriminatory safeguards to support its domestic interests. 274 Unlike
China, the legal framework established by China’s Accession Protocol and WTO agreements
condone discriminatory methods that the United States utilizes. As protectionist policies show,
democratic-capitalistic societies like the United States also emphasize the role of the state in both
foreign and domestic affairs. The renewal of the Patriot Act by the Obama Administration in
2011, continued military operations in the Middle East under the pretext of the war on terror
since unilaterally intervening in the region in 2003, and reports of increased surveillance by the
National Security Agency are a few illustrations of the American government dealing with its
strategic interests in the era of globalization in a similar way to the Chinese government.
However, the best example of Washington emphasizing the role of the state is demonstrated by
the government-sponsored bailout of banks and crucial sectors to the American economy in the
wake of the Western Financial Crisis.
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Since the World Trade Organization is a Western liberal institution created by the United
States, there is a potential for the WTO to act biased and rule in favor of established Western
preferences while slighting Chinese interests. If the WTO appears one sided, then China may
become disillusioned and choose to discontinue its participation based on grievances with the
organization’s legitimacy. This does not seem likely. China is heavily invested in mastering the
legal formalities of the WTO. The country has a desire to advance its disputes with
foundationally solid legal claims as a way of solving its grievances with other actors in the
international trading system. For example, in 2012 and 2014 China challenged the legality of the
“double remedy” approach that the United States has taken in recent years of charging China
with both anti-dumping restrictions and countervailing duties in the same claim to increase the
likelihood the WTO DSB finds China guilty. 275 China filed a claim against the “double remedy”
approach in 2008, but most of its complaints were rejected on the basis of its non-market
economy status. 276 However, the DSB ruled in favor of China’s complaint filed in 2012 and
reversed the decision in the 2008 case after reviewing the legality of the United States’
practices. 277 Advancing repetitive claims through the WTO suggests China is developing the
techniques to effectively handle the problems it faces in its trading relationship. More
importantly, the rulings suggest that the WTO will handle disputes in an unbiased manner
despite its organizational roots as a Western institution. In a recent complaint, China questioned
the methodology the U.S. employs when conducting anti-dumping investigations involving
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Chinese products. 278 As a result of these developments, it is unlikely that certain tactics the U.S.
uses to exploit China’s NME status will persist in the future, especially once the WTO grants
China FME status. Likewise, it should be expected that China will utilize the DSB to force other
WTO members like the United States to remove other discriminatory barriers that will be out of
date once China receives FME designation. China’s strategy reflects that the country is
supporting the multilateral structure of the international system by utilizing the WTO to
proactively resolve the challenges in its trading relationship with other WTO members,
specifically the United States.

Analysis of China and the South China Sea

In the South China Sea, military tensions have had little effect on the overall diplomatic
relations of the countries involved. This is the case even in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship,
which allegedly is the most antagonistic relationship among claimants involved in the SCS
dispute. Referencing the oil dispute with Vietnam in 2014, Yi Xianliang, deputy director-general
of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, ruled out the chances
of military conflict boiling over in the SCS, stating, “we have never, are not and will never send
military forces. Because we are carrying out normal, civilian, commercial activities”. 279 Even
though competing sovereignty claims remain unresolved, actors continue to pursue their distinct
interest in the SCS while managing minor incidents to sustain economic relationships. The
emphasis in the SCS is on management, not conflict.
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While conflicts in the South China Sea are a major foundation of speculators who foresee
the spoiler scenario manifesting itself, China’s role as an economic powerhouse in the region
downplays the likelihood of disputes in the SCS boiling over to disrupt international stability.
Furthermore, China is aware that exacerbating its trading partners’ fear over its intentions in the
SCS could disrupt its goal of economic development, having an adverse effect on domestic
affairs. For these reasons, it is unlikely that the South China Sea will become a flashpoint in the
future. Countries have actively managed minor incidents when they have occurred in the region
and all express an interest in maintaining status quo peace and stability. Overall, the evidence
offered in favor of the supporter scenario discredits fears over Chinese assertiveness in the post2008 era. While the first school of thought points out how China’s increasing power capabilities
exacerbate hysteria over negative trends in the SCS, the second school of thought dilutes the
likelihood of these events leading China to act as a spoiler. Evidence offered by the second
school of thought points to consistency in a strategy where China adopts non-confrontational
methods of securing its position in the South China Sea. Furthermore, China is aware of the
realities that shape the contours of its policy in the South China Sea.

As political scientist Ning Liao states, “Beijing’s positive approach to the regional
engagement however does not mean its automatic socialization into the rules and norms of a
multilateral regime”. 280 Like most countries, China will prioritize its national interests over
aspects of the global liberal order that hinder its security. China is reluctant to accept the
legitimacy of Western oriented policies in the Asian region given the fact that international law
does not consider the historical roots of China’s claims in the SCS debate. As a result, China has
invoked its right to defy arbitration. The reason China refuses to participate in international
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arbitration is that the tribunal may disregard China’s historical claims in resolving the dispute,
and/or China is concerned that Vietnam and the Philippines will be able to leveraging the
Chinese government into accepting a resolution that it does not play a direct role in negotiating.
International arbitration runs the risk of undermining the validity of Chinese sovereignty, despite
the country’s role position as the historically dominant actor in the region prior to the Opium
Wars period. A core aspect of China’s multilateral approach is informed by this principle. It
wants to form a multilateral structure based on respect of sovereignty rather than its disregard. 281
Referencing claims in the South China Sea, Chinese President Xi Jinping states that “we are
strongly committed to safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and security, and defending our
territorial integrity”. 282 This quote emphasizes that China will actively defend aspects of its
foreign policy that are integral to domestic considerations. In referencing the defense of its
sovereignty, China is in line with principles of the global liberal order even though it will not
participate in the international tribunal. However, the Chinese government has stated that it will
remain receptive to bilaterally negotiating a resolution with other claimants in the region. In
2010, the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC took place in
both China and Vietnam. Despite the fears of China’s increasing assertiveness in the post-2008
era spoiling the status quo, relations between the two seem stable and constructive. While China
remains open to compromise, it cannot be doubted that its role as a relatively influential actor in
both the regional and international community will give the country priority in any future
negotiations. The United States and international actors should acknowledge the logical
foundations of China’s argument and engage the country in reaching a settlement of the dispute.
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Any major resolution will be based in China’s satisfaction with the deal on the basis that it will
not impede its sovereignty in the region as a developing power with increasing objectives on the
global stage.

Even though China is opposed to international arbitration in the SCS, it still demonstrates
status quo behavior by avoiding an outbreak of military conflict over sovereignty claims. China
and other actors in the region prioritize joint economic development and conflict management.
Historically, regional relationships have improved, and the normalization of diplomatic relations
between actors has prevented the South China Sea from evolving into a flashpoint. China’s
militarization is aimed at defending sovereignty, stability and territorial integrity. Chinese
military diplomacy is not offensive in nature. Even if it were, the United States and its allies
would respond to outright aggression. Neither Southeast Asian states nor the United States will
accept a Sino-centric nautical order. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, associate professors of
strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, state that if the rise of China manifests itself in this way,
competing powers would push back. 283 The United States would no doubt intervene in the South
China Sea if China’s actions threatened to harm American interests. For economic and security
purposes, despite the fact that the U.S. has no direct geopolitical stake in the region, the South
China Sea is squarely at the center of U.S. maritime interests. 284 The balance of military power
between China and the countries of Southeast Asia is clearly shifting in China’s favor, but its
military is still far outmatched by the United States. In the immediate future, China is far from
possessing the necessary capabilities to control the Spratlys, and lacks the technology, military
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and power projection capabilities to impose naval hegemony in Southeast Asia. 285 A report from
the Pentagon in 2011 on the Chinese military illustrates the point that the American military far
exceeds the power capabilities of the Chinese military. Less than 30 percent of China’s naval
surface forces, air forces, and air defense forces and only 55 percent of its submarine fleet could
be considered modern. In short, China is unable to challenge U.S. dominance at sea or
dramatically alter the balance of power maintained by the United States in the region. 286 When
China passed a law that required foreign aircraft to identify their movements in the East China
Sea to the Chinese government, the United States flew two B-52 bombers through China’s newly
announced “Air Defense Identification Zone” without informing Beijing in advance. Given the
United States’ economic and strategic interest in the region, it is by no means fated that China
can dictate its terms to weaker neighbors under prevailing circumstances. As Yoshihara states,
the United States and its Southeast Asian allies should take care not to hype Chinese intentions
or capabilities. 287 In the future, status quo stability will persist as both regional and international
actors dictate what is and is not acceptable behavior in the South China Sea.

That being said, China’s growing influence in the region provides it with the capabilities
to defend its sovereignty claims and pursue its energy needs crucial to domestic development.
Even though the pivot to East Asia highlights the United States presence in the region, the
hegemon seems prepared to accept China’s increasing influence in the region. Despite Hilary
Clinton’s remarks in 2010 that suggested the U.S. would act as a mediator in the dispute based
on international law, the US is not a signatory of UNCLOS, and its official policy takes no
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position on competing actors’ sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. 288 In 2012 when the
Philippines challenged China’s construction on the Scarborough Shoal, the United States refused
to side with the Philippines, despite the mutual defense treaty the two countries share. 289 This
allows China ample room to maneuver when defining its role in the SCS while at the same time
testing the extent of U.S. commitment to the region.

China’s Future Relationship with the International Political System
At China’s 11th Ambassadorial Conference in July 2009, former Chinese President Hu
Jintao addressed hundreds of foreign policy professionals on China’s relationship with the
international political system. In addition to reiterating themes of peaceful development and
abiding by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (mutual respect for territorial integrity
and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence), Hu emphasized three points for his audience of party
officials, diplomats, and practitioners to consider. First, China should increase the role of soft
power, that is, the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies, in building
its comprehensive national power. 290 Second, foreign policy officials should adopt a more active
stance in certain areas of foreign affairs. Third, Hu stated the importance of adapting to
multilateralism in order to promote Chinese interests. 291
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These three points reflect the Chinese government’s foreign policy in the international
political system in the post-2008 era. Hu’s speech notes the continued importance of
multilateralism to China’s foreign policy approach, but he also directed China to adopt a more
active approach in select areas of its relationship with the outside world. Furthermore, China’s
increasing economic influence will co-opt actors into accepting China’s policies. Despite
growing activism in China’s strategy, the Chinese government is aware that its foreign policy
approach is framed by American hegemony, and an overall relationship with the United States
that, if disrupted, would be harmful to both countries. The institutionalization of Sino-U.S.
economic ties has formed a symbiotic relationship between the two countries. Another speech by
Hu in 2011 supports this point. Titled “Building a China-U.S. Cooperative Partnership Based on
Mutual Respect and Mutual Benefit” and delivered in the United States, the speech first
enunciated the broad common interests of each country, from upholding peace and stability to
pursuing the development of the Asian-Pacific region and strengthening diplomatic cooperation.
Building on these points, Hu continued by stating that the United States and China are different
in history, culture, social systems and level of development, and therefore, it is not abnormal for
the U.S. and China to have disagreements. Commenting on these disagreements, Hu emphasized
that the two countries should respect their distinct interests and handle sensitive issues in a
proper manner. China has an interest in managing disputes on equal footing with the United
States, rather than being leveraged by American hegemony. Despite disagreement, Hu concluded
his speech by asserting that China “does not pose a military threat to any country” and “will
never seek hegemony or pursue an expansionist policy. 292
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Despite a turnover in leadership from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping in 2013, I argue that there
is continuity in the Chinese government’s overall strategy to influence the development of a
multipolar world while pursuing domestic development. Even though China’s capacities as a
rising power are increasing, the foundation of Xi’s policy approach, like Hu’s, is rooted in
Deng’s strategy for international affairs. In 2012, Xi stated that the world is more interdependent
and interconnected, and that there is a trend towards multipolarism and economic globalization.
In keeping with this trend, Xi announced that the United States and China are exploring a new
type of relationship between major powers based on “win-win cooperation and mutual respect”
that will be a “pioneering effort in the history of international relations”. 293 While the U.S and
China, and the international community more broadly, have shared interests, Xi went on to
encourage all countries to “see each other's strategic intentions objectively and rationally, respect
each other's interests and concerns, and strengthen coordination and cooperation on regional and
international issues”. 294 Based on this criterion, it should be expected that China will take a firm
stance on its strategic considerations while abiding by the same practices it preaches to control
and manage differences. All elements of China’s strategy stem from prioritizing its long-term
development to achieve its security objectives and deal with domestic challenges. Maintaining
conditions favorable to economic development is at the core of China’s foreign policy approach.

At the Asian Annual Conference for 2015 held at the Baao Forum, Xi outlined the
trajectory of China’s economic strategy and the security conditions that the country seeks to
maintain into the future. These two critical points from President Xi’s statement provides a
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means to thinking about China’s future relationship with the international political system. As Xi
states,

In the coming five years, China will import more than US$10 trillion of goods, Chinese
investment abroad will exceed US$500 billion, and more than 500 million outbound
visits will be made by Chinese tourists. China will stick to its basic state policy of
opening up, improve its investment climate, and protect the lawful rights and interests of
investors. What China needs most is a harmonious and stable domestic environment and
a peaceful and tranquil international environment…turbulence or war runs against the
fundamental interests of the Chinese people. 295
Xi’s equal emphasis on development and security guiding China’s foreign policy resonates
heavily with the architecture of the international political system described by Ikenberry. In the
same speech, Xi’s closing remark that “history has taught us no country who has tried to achieve
its goals with force ever succeeded” reveals that, from the Chinese perspective, great power
politics have advanced beyond the reality proclaimed by the spoiler scenario. A continuation in
the strategies of Hu and Xi’s highlights that the Chinese government is working within the
multilateral structure of the world, reinforcing the evidence from the second school of thought
uncovered in the WTO and SCS case studies. Although China will defend the role of the state in
mediating China’s relationship with the global economy, it will continue to reform its economic
structure to meet market standards of the international trading system. And, while Xi Jinping has
expressed that China will actively defend its sovereignty in the South China Sea, this reflects a
continuation of Hu Jintao’s policy advice in 2009 to take a more active stance on some aspects of
China’s foreign policy. As Liao notes, “The linchpin of Chinese foreign policy making is
maintaining the integrity of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Any
multilateral principle in China’s diplomacy should be subordinate to this rule of thumb”. 296
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While the assumptions of the supporter scenario are the most relevant for identifying the
trajectory of China’s rise, this dominant consideration in Chinese foreign policy will also cause
aspects of the shirker scenario to manifest itself when China’s interests influence it to contradict
the legitimacy of select international norms that challenge its strategic approach to the
international political system. In describing the interests of countries, Xi quoted the Chinese
philosopher, Mencius, in saying that “things are born to be different”, but as the Chinese
president emphasized to the Obama Administration in 2014, China has a desire to effectively
control and manage these differences. 297 In response, Obama remarked to the press that, in an
effort to narrow their disagreements, Xi has been frank and open in discussing the issues between
the two countries. 298 The shirker scenario overlooks aspects of conflict management and
cooperation on the international stage. Chinese officials express an understanding of the dynamic
of international politics, which indicates that the cooperative stability of the supporter scenario is
likely to persist in the long term. While the United States will retain its global influence, the age
of unipolarity is in decline. Active dispute management between the U.S. and a rising China
suggests that, in the future, the divergent interests of major countries will negotiate the
international political system.
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